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This report contains the description of a valuation performed on LATAM Airlines, 
the largest airline in South America. This study was conducted by analysing the 
factors that may affect the company’s value (both macroeconomic, industry, and 
company-specific factors), whilst also performing a series of scenario analyses, 
given the uncertain times which characterize the present. An estimated share 
price (the target value for the 31st of December of 2020) was then computed, 
which prompts us to recommend investors to sell their positions on LATAM 
Airlines. 
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▪ We recommend investor to SELL their position on LATAM 
Airlines Group, given our 2020 target price of $2,35. 
▪ The COVID-19 crisis and the resulting travel restrictions are 
heavily impacting LATAM’s results in 2020. The current 
uncertainty in the general market & aviation industry has 
increased the systematic risk and probability of default, which is 
reflected in our estimated bankruptcy probability of 20%. 
▪ However, after a revenue decrease of 55% in 2020, the 
company is expected to bounce back in the subsequent years, with 
a revenue growth of 53% in 2021 and 35% in 2022. Domestic 
passenger levels are expected to be back at pre-pandemic levels in 
2022, with international passengers fully recovering in 2023. 
▪ Parallelly, the mid- to long-term outlook is mildly 
pessimistic for the company in terms of its market share. 
Following the trend of the rise of Low-Cost Carriers in South 
America, we expect LATAM to lose, on average,  3% market share 
in Brazil and 6% in each of its remaining domestic markets until 
2030, compared to 2019. 
▪ We estimate our target share price based on an APV 
approach, with a terminal growth rate of 3,13% and an unlevered 
cost of capital of 7,02%. Furthermore, it takes into account a 20% 




LATAM Airlines Group S.A. is a Chilean airline conglomerate, 
which operates in passenger and cargo transportation. It operates 
in Chile, Peru, Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Brazil either 
directly or through subsidiaries. It can be classified as a classic 
carrier which operates regionally and on longer international routes. 
Its currently operating fleet amounts to 331 aircrafts. 
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(Values in $ millions) 2018 2019 2020F 
Revenues 10,368 10,431 4,692 
EBITDA 2,259 2,212 427 
EBIT 887 741 -946 
Net Profit 310 190 -963 
EBITDA Margin (%) 21,8 21,2 9,1 
EPS 0,51 0,31 -1,58 
Dividends per Share ($) 0,09 0,09 0 



















Table of Contents 
 
COMPANY OVERVIEW ........................................................................... 3 
COMPANY DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................... 3 
DELTA’S ACQUISITION OF LATAM........................................................................ 4 
SHAREHOLDER STRUCTURE ................................................................................. 5 
THE SECTOR ........................................................................................... 6 
PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION ........................................................................... 6 
▪ Industry Characteristics & Recent Performance ..................... 6 
CARGO .................................................................................................................. 7 
▪ Industry Characteristics & Recent Performance ..................... 7 
COMPETITION ........................................................................................................ 9 
FUTURE OUTLOOK .............................................................................................. 11 
METHODOLOGY - ASSUMPTIONS .......................................................13 
REVENUE ............................................................................................................ 13 
COSTS ................................................................................................................. 17 
NWC ................................................................................................................... 20 
INVESTED CAPITAL ............................................................................................. 20 
UNLEVERED COST OF CAPITAL .......................................................................... 21 
COVID-19 .......................................................................................................... 22 
VALUATION ............................................................................................25 
VALUATION OUTCOME ........................................................................................ 26 
MULTIPLES .......................................................................................................... 26 
KEY RISKS .......................................................................................................... 26 
▪ Operating in South America ..................................................... 26 
▪ Fuel Price Volatility .................................................................... 27 
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ....................................................................................... 27 
FINAL REMARKS & RECOMMENDATION ............................................27 
APPENDIX ..............................................................................................28 




















Headquartered in Santiago, Chile, LATAM Airlines Group S.A. is the largest Latin 
American airline conglomerate. LATAM Airlines Group was formed after the 
merger of LAN (Chile) and TAM (Brazil) on the 22nd of June of 2012. As of today, 
both companies continue to work as separate companies, under the lead of 
LATAM Airlines Group, which also provides the executive management.  
A fleet of 331 operating planes with more than 1300 daily flights and 74,2 million 
transported Passengers in 2019 (68,8 in 2018) makes the LATAM Group come 
close to being one of the 10 largest Airlines in the world. The company can be 
classified as a traditional carrier (opposed to Low-Cost Carrier (LCC)), as its 
focus is more directed towards a higher flight experience, intended to attract 
executive flying, especially on its international long-haul segment.  
LATAM has developed a wide route network, flying to 145 destinations, divided 
through 26 countries, in all 6 permanently inhabited continents. The group also 
has subsidiaries directly present, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Argentina, 
serving these domestic markets.  
As well as passenger operations, the company also operates cargo, which, in 








LATAM currently employs almost 42 thousand workers, divided by the 
aforementioned countries.  
The Group reported total revenues of $10,43 billion in 2019, with around 86% 
steaming from passenger transportation. 
 
Exhibit 4: Revenue by segment 




















Exhibit 1: Revenue per region 







Exhibit 2: Transported 
Passengers in mln (2019), 
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Exhibit 3: Domestic Market Share, first half of 
2019, Source: CAPA 
 
  








Breaking down the passenger revenues into segmentations, it is observable that, 
in 2019, LATAM received 49,4% of its passenger revenues from domestic 
passengers (45% in 2018) and 50,6% from international passengers (55% in 
2018). The increase in domestic revenue in 2019 is mostly due to the resurgence 
of the Brazilian economy. International passenger revenue includes both regional 
international travelling (within South America) and Long-haul flights between 
South America and other continents. LATAM is the largest carrier of international 
flights within South America with a 41% market share and also between South 
America and Asia-Pacific with a market share of 58%.  
The EBIT in 2019 equalled 741,6 million, using the new IFRS16 accounting 
standard in which all operating leases are now activated in the Balance Sheet. 
This resulted in an EBIT margin of 7,1%. Net Income attributable to Shareholders 
reached 190.4 million and ROIC (including Goodwill) equalled 5,1% in 2019. 
Delta’s acquisition of LATAM 
On the 26th of September of 2019, Delta Airlines announced the purchase of a 
20% stake of LATAM’s equity to form a strategic alliance between the two 
airlines, with the goal of strengthening both companies’ international route 
network by connecting North and South America. The acquisition was completed 
on the 1st January of 2020.  
LATAM then swiftly announced their exit Oneworld Alliance on the 1st of May 
2020, an alliance of which it had been a member since 2000 (through LAN Chile). 
Additionally, the deal previews a 350 million USD investment by Delta in 
LATAM’s CAPEX. Furthermore, Delta will also purchase 4 of the operating Airbus 
350-900 in LATAM’s fleet and will assume the outstanding order of 10 additional 
Airbus 350s until 2025. In exchange Delta will get representation on LATAM’s 
board.  
Besides the expected value creation due to the strengthening in the international 
route network, the Delta representation on LATAM’s board might have positive 
future effects for investors, as Delta is the most profitable full-service carrier in 
the US and with their knowledge, LATAM might be able to enhance its 
operational efficiency soon.  
Nevertheless, there is still uncertainty regarding whether LATAM will join Delta’s 
Sky Alliance or just partner with Delta. Should the second be the case, leaving 
Oneworld Alliance can hamper LATAM’s business in Europe, where LATAM 
currently has 67 of its 155 code-sharing destinations. Europe accounts for 






Exhibit 6: Sales vs. Net Income, 















Exhibit 5: International market share 
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Exhibit 7: Efficiency Comparison, 
Source: own estimates 
 
  








held or properly renegotiated/replaced after the exit, LATAM could be facing an 
important loss in this market. 
Shareholder structure 
LATAM Airlines Group is listed on the Santiago Stock Exchange (SSE) under the 
Ticker LTM.SE and furthermore on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) under 
the ticker LTM.  
The Ownership Structure as of 31st March 2020 is as follows: The highest 
participation amount of 21,5% is held by the Cueto Group (Chile), the 
Investment Group of the Cueto family (of which LATAM’s current CEO Enrique 
Cueto also is a member). As part of the aforementioned deal, Delta holds a 20% 
share. Qatar Airways has a share of 10%, the Chilean pension funds (AFPs) 
16%, American depositary receipts (ADRs) 3,9%, the Amaro Group holds 
2.0%, foreign investors account for 8,9% of outstanding shares and other 
investors for 17.7%. In total, there are 606,407,693 shares outstanding. 
Amongst other investors, Axxion should be highlighted, as even though it only 
holds, as of the date of this report, 3,0% of the company’s shares, it has 
connections to Chile’s president, Mr. Sebastian Piñeda. Mr. Piñeda formerly held 
27% of LAN Chile’s shares and sold the vast majority of them to the Cueto Group 
after his election. In this time of uncertainty, there is the possibility (albeit 
thoroughly low) that LATAM gets nationalized by the Chilean government. This 
would likely force Axxion to sell its shares due to an impending conflict of 
interests. All shareholders have similar voting power, according to their 
ownership of the company. 
Regarding dividends, LATAM paid, in 2019, a dividend of $0,09 per share, an 
increase from the previous two years, in which it had paid $0,03 and $0,08, 
respectively. In 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the company will not 
distribute dividends to any shareholder. Under Chilean law, companies are 
obliged to distribute 30% of their net profits to shareholders. This value can, 
however, be deferred to a later date if approved at the Annual Shareholders’ 
Meeting. 
Additionally, LATAM is due to receive a loan of $341 million from the Brazilian 
Development Bank. 25% of this loan will be issued through convertible bonds, 
which bring an option to convert into newly issued LATAM shares in 5 years, 
causing existing shareholders to lose value. Estimates of the dilution this would 
represent to pre-existing shareholders were computed for different share prices 



















Exhibit 8: Shareholder Structure, 
Source: Company Data 
 
  









       
Share Price 2 2,35 2,5 2,88 3 5
Warrant Value ($ million) 85,25 85,25 85,25 85,25 85,25 85,25
Shares Issued (million) 43 36 34 30 28 17




▪ Industry Characteristics & Recent Performance 
Performing a Porter 5 forces analysis, we conclude that the airline industry 
characterizes itself as a highly competitive and capital-intensive industry. We 
observe a high degree of rivalry and a medium threat of new entrants. The high 
amount of capital required, along with strong regulatory requirements, are the 
only aspects hindering new entrants. Buyer power is also evaluated as strong, 
which is reflected in the high price sensitivity of customers and tendency to 
switch between airlines. Frequent flyer programs and recently increasing efforts 
in creating a brand (for example, Delta’s loyalty programs) are factors that lower 
the buyer power, but only succeed in the business travelling segment.  
Supplier power is high due to the oligopoly of Airbus & Boeing and the limited 
amount of airports in larger cities, which are run by local governments or large 
enterprises. All in all, this leads to high competition in the sector, especially 
observable in the pricing of airfares. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century we have seen the rise of the LCC’s in 
Europe and the US with Ryanair and JetBlue being the most famous examples. 
LCC’s have driven the growth in passenger volume and, as a result of their 
business model of cutting costs whilst charging for any extra services. Due to the 
increased competition in the industry, there is a decrease in average passenger 
fares by more than 50% observable within the last 20 years. This disruptive 
change in the industry led many traditional carriers to either create Low-Cost 
subsidiaries or start to operate with the Low-Cost business model on domestic 
short-haul flights. In recent years LATAM did the latter and started to change 
their business model on short-haul regional flights, while maintaining their 
previous business model in international flights. This resulted, in LATAM’s 
specific case, to less loss in market share in the domestic segment. On the other 
hand it caused a drop in flight prices and hence lower generated revenue per 
available seat kilometre from 8,4 in 2013 to 6,0 in 2019 (Exhibit 13).  
 
Exhibit 12: Average flight prices, 
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Exhibit 11: Low Cost worldwide 
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Exhibit 14: Tourism growth Latin 















Exhibit 10: 5 Forces Analysis, 
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Exhibit 13: Passenger Revenue per 
ASK – LATAM Airlines, own 
estimations 
Exhibit 9: Shareholder Dilution 
Source: Own estimates 
 
  








In general, the passenger transportation can be divided into executive flights and 
leisure flights or tourism. Tourism is currently trending in South America and 
has showed strong growth over the last decade, with an average CAGR of 7,5% 
in international tourists.  
This segment is highly intertwined with low-cost flights, as non-business 
customers tend to be very price sensitive (as seen on Exhibit 16). On the other 
hand, executives tend to prefer higher quality flight experiences, with loyalty 
programs being the closest to what can be considered a competitive advantage 
in the industry. Executives travelling can be considered a B2B service and 
businessmen typically are registered in those programs.1  
LATAM airlines currently has the fourth largest loyalty program in the world and 
later in this report this will be discussed in detail, evaluating if this can be 
considered a relevant competitive advantage and how big of a role it plays in the 
valuation. As a guideline, executive class seats of a 300 person aircraft account 
for 40% of revenues.2 
South American Passengers increased in 2018 by 5,6% and in the period 
between 2014 and 2018 at an average CAGR of 3,3%, which is below the 
worldwide average of 6,2% in that time period. This is due to the recession which 
hit Brazil in 2015 and 2016, and decreased the Brazilian passenger volume by 
7,7% in 2016. Therefore, the total South American passenger volume decreased 
by 1,7%. It is important to note that the Brazilian market is the biggest market in 
the South American aviation sector representing 53% of the continents 
passenger volume in 2018.  
Cargo 
▪  Industry Characteristics & Recent Performance 
The Air Cargo Industry is deeply connected to world trade and industrial 
production and, consequently, global economic activity. In 20193, even though it 
represented less than 1% of world trade in volume, it accounted for 35% of its 
total value.  
This industry has a similar fragmentation to that of the air passenger transport 
one, with the addition of cargo-only carriers, express carriers (which have a 
network of transportation methods that allows for faster delivery times, focusing 
mostly on small shipments), and ACMI – Aircraft, Crew, Maintenance, and 
Insurance providers. However, passenger carriers dominate this industry, as 
 
1 PMJ consulting 
2 Information from an Interview with Magdalena Espinoza (El Diario Financiero) 
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Exhibit 15: Tourism growth Brazil 














Exhibit 18: Cargo industry market 
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Exhibit 17: Passenger numbers (2014-
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Exhibit 16: Reasons for choosing 
an LCC over another, Source: 
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around 50% of air cargo4 is transported using the belly capacity in passenger 
planes, with most airlines additionally having their own fleet of freighters. The 
industry market shares by the end of 20185 are present on Exhibit 18.  
From 2014 to 2018, the cargo industry averaged a CAGR of 4,62%, reaching a 
value of $111,3 bn in 2018. RTKs (Revenue Tonne-Kilometres) averaged a 
CAGR of 4.59% during the same period, exceeding $260 bn in 2018.  
However, 2019 was a down year, with a negative growth of 3.3%, measured by 
RTKs, and a contraction of cargo revenues of 8,09%. 
The growth in the first period is explained by three main factors: increased global 
trade, the growth in e-commerce (especially in China and Asia-Pacific), and 
increased air-connectivity, both in terms of increased routes and increased 
traffic (not only in cargo, but also in passengers). It should be noted, however, 
that all these factors are affected by economic growth. Hence, it is also 
important to account for GDP growth when assessing the cargo industry, 
especially in how it mirrors the growth of RTKs, as seen on Exhibit 18. 
During 2014-2018, world GDP grew by an average of 3,60% annually, with 
global trade increasing 0,60% annually. The intrinsic relationship between global 
trade and cargo revenues can be observed on Exhibit 20. 
E-commerce is a key driver for the growth of global trade, as the digitalisation 
and globalisation of the world’s most developed economies have allowed 
customers to access virtual marketplaces nearly anywhere in the world. Exhibit 
18 shows how e-commerce has been a growing share of global retail commerce, 
standing at 14,1% of global retail sales in 2019. Asian countries, particularly 
China and the developed East-Asian nations have been the main contributors to 
this growth, with China’s e-commerce market growing at an annual CAGR of 
18,37% during 2014-2018, and a further 11,33% in 2019. Exhibits 22 and 23 
show the growth of e-commerce in the Asia-Pacific region and China.  
Air-connectivity, measured by the evolution of traffic (both passenger and cargo 
flights) has also been increasing steadily during the aforementioned period. 
Exhibit 21 shows the evolution of worldwide flights, which have increased 3,66% 
annually, on average, during 2014-2018 and a further 2,36% in 2019. 
The main justifications for the negative outcome in 2019 were the trade tensions 
between the United States and China, and a slower economic growth of 
2,90%. These two aspects led to a decrease of 2,98% in global trade. Exhibit 24 
shows how the lower international trade led to lower cargo revenues and RTKs.  
 
4 IATA – “Air Cargo Vital in the fight against COVID-19”  
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Exhibit 19: Evolution of Cargo Revenue 
Growth, compared to RTK growth and 
World GDP growth. Sources: IMF, 
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Exhibit 21: E-commerce growth as a 
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Exhibit 22: Cross-Border E-commerce 












2014 2015 2016* 2017* 2018* 2019*  
Exhibit 23: Gross merchandise volume 
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Exhibit 20: Cargo and World Trade’s 
very similar growth patterns. 
Sources: Statista and WTO 
 
  










Although not as high as in the US and Europe, LATAM faces high competition in 
every country in which it operates. The competitiveness of these markets has 
increased over the past 10 years.  
As follows is an individual description of the most important South American 
competitors (SKY and JetSmart are excluded as there is no publicly available 
information): 
31.12.2019 LATAM (USD) Gol (BRL) Azul (BRL) Delta (USD) Peers avg.
Market Cap 6.161 12.970 19.063 37.822
Net Debt 9.815 12.557 14.487 16.723
D/E-ratio 1,59 0,97 0,76 0,4 1,27
2y Sales CAGR 2,21% 14,70% 21,36% 6,90% 6,53%
ROIC 6,10% 23,36% 19,66% 20,66% 12,40%
EBIT margin 6,02% 15,38% 17,75% 14,08% 8,86%
EV/EBIT 25,73 11,97 16,52 8,24 19,60
P/E 32,35 72,06 23,14 7,93 14,90  
Gol (Brazil, LCC): Gol is the largest airline in Brazil, measured by passengers 
transported per year. It has a fleet of 122 planes (all Boeing 737s) and a market 
share of around 40%, slightly above LATAM. Gol’s strategy is to maintain its low 
operating costs, whilst maintaining its leadership position in the Brazilian market, 
and further aims to expand its domestic and international routes, particularly to 
the United States. The company typically focusses on the busiest airports and 
will directly put pressure on LATAM. Even though it is actually considered an 
LCC, Gol has a high proportion of business travellers (38% of the total Brazilian 
market in 2018) and is also directly competing with LATAM in this segment.  
In 2019, it reported operating revenues of 13,87 billion Brazilian Reais ($ 3,5 
billion). This represents a growth of 21,5% from the previous year, in which it 
had already grown 7,9%. According to its financial statements we estimated an 
EBIT margin of 15,4% in 2019 and a ROIC of 23%. At the end of 2019 they 
traded at an EV/EBIT multiple of 12 and, at the date of this report, 7,6.  
Azul (Brazil, LCC): Founded in 2008 by David Neeleman (founder of JetBlue), 
Azul is an emerging Brazilian airline, which has been experiencing a strong 
increase in market share in Brazil over the past few years. The Brazilian 
passenger volume increased between 2008 and 2019 by 90%, and Azul alone 
captured 60% of that growth. Its strategy is based on growth and cost efficiency, 
and expansion of both their domestic and international networks. The company 
usually intends to maintain a viable competitive position and avoids crowded 
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Exhibit 25: Gol Data in mln Reais, 
Source: Company Data 
 
Exhibit 28: Azul Data in mln Reais, 
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Exhibit 26: Gol - Brazil market 
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Exhibit 27: Azul – Brazil market 
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Exhibit 24: Comparison of Cargo, 
World Trade, and Flight Growth 
Rates. Sources: Statista, WTO 
 
  








network overlap 88%). By the end of 2019, it had an operating fleet of 142 
aircrafts. Over the next years, they receive further A320neos to make their fleet 
one of the most efficient on the planet in terms of fuel efficiency. Their expansion 
will increase competition, although it is less likely to hamper LATAM as much as 
Gol, SKY and JetSmart are expected to. 
Azul reported Revenues of 11,4 billion Reais ($ 2,85 billion) in 2019. Revenue 
growth was 24,3% in 2019 and 18,4% in 2018. We estimate an EBIT margin of 
17,7% in 2019 and a ROIC of 19,6%. At the end of 2019 it traded at a 16,5 
EV/EBIT multiple and, at the date of this report, 9,5.  
SKY (Chile, LCC): A privately held Chilean low-cost Airline, founded in 2001, 
and currently Chile’s second largest airline. It mostly operates in Chile and Peru, 
but also offer regional international flights to Brazil and Argentina. Its current fleet 
amounts to 24 airplanes, with 27 orders outstanding. SKY’s goal is becoming the 
low-cost leader in South America within the next 10 years and expand its hubs to 
5 South American countries.6 Due to their expansion, they will increase the 
competition and further challenge LATAM in more countries other than Chile. 
JetSmart (Chile, LCC): A private Chilean Ultra Low-Cost carrier, created by the 
US Private Equity fund Indigo Partners in 2017. It quickly established presence in 
Chile and, in 2019, expanded to Colombia, Peru and Brazil. It currently has an 
operating fleet of 17 planes. Their strategy is similar to that of SKY, with an 
expansion in the domestic presence in Peru and Colombia and international 
network, which is also reflected in their outstanding orders of 75 aircraft of the 
Airbus A320 family. 
Avianca (Colombia, Full-Service): The second largest Latin American airline, 
after LATAM. At the end of 2019, it had an operating fleet of 171 aircrafts 
(including 58 operating leases). It is the most direct competitor of LATAM in 
terms of regional international flights, especially on executive travelling.  
In 2019, Avianca reported revenues of $ 4,6 billion (a decrease from $ 4,9 
billion in 2018). Its operations resulted in an EBIT of $ 45 million (a decrease 
from $ 232 million in 2018). We estimate a ROIC of 1% in 2019 and an average 
of 5,2% between 2015 and 2018.  
It is also important to refer that Avianca has been under financial distress since 
2019, with the company undergoing a turnaround process which included 
dropping more than 20 unprofitable routes. The company filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy in May 2020 due to the COVID-19 impact.7  
 
6 Aerotelegraph: Interview mit Holger Paulmann, Sky Airline 










SKY: Chile market share
 
Exhibit 29: SKY – Chile market 














JetSmart: Chile market share
 
Exhibit 30: JetSmart – Chile market 
share, Source: Chile JAC 
 
  










Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, it seemed the shift in the Latin American 
aviation industry towards LCC was not entirely completed. In Mexico and Brazil, 
however, LCC’s already have the highest market share, as it can be seen on 
Exhibits 31 and 32. Thus, the same evolutionary process that happened in the 
US and EU is expected to affect the rest of South American countries. Peru, for 
instance, is being targeted by SKY and JetSmart.  
It is expected that LCCs will first establish themselves on a domestic basis and, 
once they establish a strong route network, they will expand internationally. 
Following the trend in Mexico and Brazil, it is estimated that in the mid-to long-
term future Low-Cost market share will represent 50% to 70% of the South 
American market. 
This increasing competition will take market share from LATAM, either resulting 
in fewer passengers transported, or lower its fares (or eventually both), thus 
resulting in lower revenue per passenger. We estimate that this will ultimately 
hinder revenue growth by 1,6% per year8. This is expected to happen primarily 
on domestic and short-haul international flights.  
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the general outlook was favourable, with 
global passenger growth to be between around 5% per year with South America 
being the growth driver after Asia Pacific and the Middle East. This was justified 
by the increase in private consumption in emerging economies (Exhibit 33), GDP 
growth, population growth (around 1% per year in most South American 
countries) and the increased size of the Middle class worldwide (as seen on 
Exhibit 34). 
However, and as predicted, this expected growth in the South American 
passenger demand will be captured mostly to Low Cost Carriers. The lower 
offered fares by LCCs attract the middle class and are ultimately driving the 
industry’s strong growth prospects. As LATAM is focusing more on executive 
travelling, a better indicator for LATAM’s growth is the respective GDP growth, 
which is included in Exhibit 35. Due to the increasing competitive situation, 
LATAM airlines is not expected to maintain its market share and current position. 
Hence the company will not grow as much as its LCC competitors (estimated at 
around 5% per year), but rather closer to the regional GDP and population 
growth forecasts.  
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Exhibit 31: Brazil LCC market 












Exhibit 32: MX,CL & COL: LCC 
market shares, Source: CAPA 
 
Exhibit 33: Private consumption 
forecast, emerging economies, Source: 
Airbus GMF 2018 
 
Exhibit 34: Middle Class global, 
Source: Oxford Economics 
 
  








A key obstacle of this industry is its dependence on fuel costs. Rising fuel 
costs, a key value driver of airlines, would decrease margins if not rolled over to 
customers and Cash Flows, which would ultimately result in less value creation. 
Furthermore, the threat of a trade war created uncertainty in the industry, which 
led to lower revenues.9 Financing costs were expected to increase due to 
perceived increasing interest rates. Oil Prices hit a historical low of -37$/bbl on 
20th of April and are trading currently at around 25$/bbl. 
With respect to the COVID-19 pandemic, this becomes increasingly irrelevant, as 
most of the previous assumptions for the industry’s outlook are counteracted. 
Instead of rising passenger demand, an incomparable decrease in flight volume 
of 90% is observed due to the worldwide travel restrictions and quarantine 
measurements.  
Given the COVID-19 pandemic is much likely changing the horizon of this 
industry, at least in the short-term, the future is thoroughly unpredictable. 
However, and even though some airlines might default due to this situation, 
which would theoretically result in less competition, we believe that the rise of the 
LCC’s in the long term in South America is inevitable.  
Regarding the future of the cargo industry, the e-commerce growth trend is 
expected to continue in the future. Before lockdown measures were enforced on 
virtually every major city in the world, e-commerce was expected to continue to 
grow steadily for the period 2019-2023 (as depicted on Exhibit 38)  Given the 
lockdown forces people to do most of their shopping from home, e-commerce 
can actually be expected to increase even further than expected. During the 
same period, global GDP and international trade are also expected to increase, 
especially on the rebound of the COVID-19 pandemic. It should also be noted 
that, even though we are surrounded by a through uncertainty regarding the 
present pandemic (making general forecasts for the short-term future almost 
obsolete, as these keep changing on a weekly-to-monthly basis), the long-term 
forecasts for the cargo industry remain unchanged for now, as a 2-to-3 year 
recovery period is widely assumed10, with the indicators converging to pre-
pandemic growth levels after recovery.  
The formerly mentioned drivers, mainly in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East 
regions, are expected to generate a CAGR of around 4,2% over the next 20 
years. East Asia-North America and East-Asia Europe are the trade relations 
expected to be the largest in 20 years, with both expected to grow 4,7% 
annually. Intra-China air cargo is expected to be the fastest growing segment 
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Exhibit 35: Growth: Latam Passenger 
revenue vs. Latin GDP vs. South 
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Exhibit 38: LATAM Market Share 
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Exhibit 37: LATAM Passenger Forecast 























Exhibit 36: LATAM Market Share 












over the next 20 years, at 6,3% per year. Regarding the segments in which 
LATAM Airlines operates, Latin America is expected to have a real GDP growth 
of 3% annually over the next 20 years. This economic growth is likely to foster 
increases in the air cargo industry in the region. The North America – Latin 
America connection is expected to grow 4,1% annually, as Chile and Colombia 
are expected to increase their exports to North America (mainly comprised of 
perishable goods). Europe – Latin America is expected to grow 4% annually, as 
the European Union is Latin America’s second largest air trade partner (after the 
United States).  
Model – Forecast & Assumptions 
In order to value LATAM Airlines Group, we chose an APV approach, as the 
COVID-19 pandemic brought question marks regarding the Financial Debt of 
LATAM and its impending need on financial aid which would de-stabilize a 
possible constant Debt ratio. Hence, it is more appropriate to calculate the Debt 
Tax Shield benefits separately from the discount rate. Our forecast period ends in 
2030, but yet in 2027 we start to use terminal value assumptions in our 
forecasting, which ultimately result in a growth rate of 3,12%. This growth is a 
function of the revenue-weighted average real GDP growth of the relevant 
countries in perpetuity and the US Dollar inflation11, which is our relevant and 
LATAM’s functioning currency. 
Revenue 
LATAM’s has three streams of revenues: Passenger Revenue (87%), Cargo 
(10%) and other revenue (3%).  
Passenger revenue: The Passenger revenue streams were divided into 
segments and further into regional components to isolate and assess the effects 
of the individual competition. The Passenger revenue was therefore divided into 
two categories: revenue from domestic flights and revenue from international 
flights. Domestic revenue was further broken down into each country’s domestic 
revenue. On the other side, international revenue was further broken down into 
regional international revenue (within South America) and long-haul 
international revenue (South America to US, EMEA & APAC). The key 
underlying value drivers are the predicted market passenger volume, LATAM’s 
market share in every segment, and the average charged fare per customer.12 
For the terminal value period, we assumed the weighted real GDP growth of 
 
11 Estimated at 1,12% for the next 10 years; using the difference between the US 10-y T-Bill and the US 10-y TIPS 
12 The concrete forecast formula in each segment was Revenue per segment = LATAM tranported passengers * average 
distance flown per passenger (assumed constant) * average fare per passenger per kilometer  
 
Exhibit 39: Revenue Breakdown 
 
  








2% in each segment. Furthermore, the market share is constant in perpetuity, as 
the market is assumed to be mature. Together with the respective U.S. Dollar 
inflation this results in revenue growth of 3,13%. 
Brazil: Brazil is the most important country for LATAM, as it accounts for 39% of 
its overall revenue. Over the past 5 years, a 1% annual decrease in market share 
was observed (with exception of 2019, mainly due to their retreat of Avianca 
Brazil). Considering the competitive situation, LATAM’s competitors Gol and Azul 
are expected to be better structured and further steal market share from LATAM. 
Furthermore, in 2019 Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro opened the air market 
and changed regulatory laws to allow for foreign ownership of Brazilian airlines. 
Consequently, SKY and JetSmart received operating approvals. This further 
supports the market share decrease, which amounts to 0,6% per year on 
average until 2027, after which it remains constant.  
In general, the Brazilian market is expected to be more mature than other South 
American countries, considering that LCCs have already been present for 10 
years and the LCC’s market share already accounts to more than 60%. For the 
overall market growth of passenger demand, we relied on third party forecasts. 
Passenger demand is expected to outperform GDP growth in the short to 
medium term and grow at 4,2% per year (after COVID-19). This is due to 
population growth of 0,8% per year, increasing middle class (40% growth from 
2003 to 2017), and increasing tourism. Furthermore, the LCCs also contribute to 
a higher passenger demand by themselves, as their lower fares encourage more 
people to travel via air transport. The average fare per passenger, an equivalent 
to revenue per customer or price, is predicted to grow at the expected local 
inflation of 3,5% per year. This results in an average revenue growth of 2,61% 
per year from 2023 until 2027, and a revenue of $ 2,3 billion in 2027. Overall, 
LATAM is able to maintain its competitive advantage in the executive travelling 
segment, but as this segment is only expected to experience a long-term GDP 
growth of 2%, it will not result in stronger revenue growth. 
Chile: In Chile, the expected drop in market share is even stronger than in Brazil, 
which is in line with recent historical losses between 2% and 7% per year in this 
country. The strong competition brought by SKY & JetSmart will result in an 
estimated annual decrease of Chilean market share of 4%, and 2% in the longer-
term. Regarding the current LCC market share of 40%, this development is 
expected to continue until LCCs reach a market share of 59%13. The average 
fare per passenger is assumed to grow at the US Dollar inflation, 1,12%. The 
total demand is forecasted to grow at 4,2% until 2025 and 3% until 2027, the 
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Exhibit 40: Brazil – Passenger Volume 
and Market Share - Forecast 
Brazil - domestic 2016 2019 2022 2025 2030
Market Passengers (mln) 90,3 97,4 101,2 112,2 125,9
Market Share 32,0% 32,4% 33,0% 31,0% 30,0%
LATAM Passengers (mln) 28,9 31,5 33,4 34,8 37,8
Average Fare (R-cents) 23,1 33,4 34,6 38,4 45,5
Revenue in Reais (bln) 7,1 11,2 12,2 14,1 18,2
Revenue in USD (bln) 2,5 2,8 2,1 2,2 2,6
Exchange Rate (BRL/USD) 3,25 4,02 5,90 6,32 7,10  
Exhibit 41: Brazil – domestic - Forecast 
Chile - domestic 2016 2019 2022 2025 2030
Market Passengers (mln) 10,8 15,0 15,6 17,3 19,4
Market Share 73,6% 58,6% 52,0% 44,0% 41,0%
LATAM Passengers (mln) 8,0 8,8 8,1 7,6 8,0
Average Fare (US-cents) 8,6 8,1 8,2 8,4 8,9
Revenue in USD (bln) 0,62 0,58 0,54 0,52 0,58  
Exhibit 42: Chile – domestic - Forecast 
 
  








beginning of our terminal period. This results in revenues of $ 527 million in 
2027 and an average CAGR of 0,1% in the period between 2023 and 2027. 
Terminal value assumptions consider a constant market share of 41%. 
Peru: Although the market share of LATAM has increased in Peru in 2019 by 
4%, Peru is estimated to be the next country in which LATAM’s market share cut 
will occur. Currently, Peru is being targeted by SKY (which has already created a 
subsidiary – SKY Peru – that fully operates in Peru) and JetSmart. Their 
expansion will lead to the same developments as in the Chilean market from 
2015 onwards. LATAM’s market share is perceived to plummet by 4% each year 
until 2024 and then 2% until 2027, in which LATAM will have its constant market 
share of 45%. Once again, the average fare per passenger is expected to 
increase at 1,12% per year. Ultimately this sets to a revenue decrease of -1,3% 
per year from 2023 until 2027 and an increase of 3,14% from 2027 to 2030. 
Colombia: Colombia is a minor domestic market for LATAM, which only 
amounted to a market share of 22% in 2019. Similarly to Chile, in recent years 
LCCs have been on the rise in Colombia, with Viva Air Colombia being the most 
prominent example. Furthermore, LATAM has a major competitor in the Full-
Service segment with Avianca in Colombia. However, it is now unclear what the 
future of Avianca is, after filing for bankruptcy.  
In the short-term future, LATAM is estimated to maintain its competitive position, 
but in the mid-term future the company is expected to lose 1% market share per 
year. The underlying economic performance looks positive for Colombia with an 
estimated GDP growth of 3% per year. Hence, passenger demand is expected to 
be strong with a CAGR of 4%. Average fares are expected to increase with 
inflation of 1,12%, which ultimately contributes to an expected 4% CAGR 
revenues on this market, from 2023 until 2027.  
Regional International: The regional international segment is closely tied to 
domestic developments. Just like Ryanair in Europe, it is expected that in the 
medium term Low-Cost Carriers in South America will expand, offering short-haul 
regional international flights at a lower price than Classic Carriers, such as 
LATAM. This is supported by the quick expansion of SKY and JetSmart. In 2018 
and 2019, the regional international market share of LATAM decreased by 1%. 
This is perceived to continue in the future, and LATAM will lose 1% per year in 
market share. The overall market is expected to grow at the same rate as the 
individual countries, 4% per year. Average fares are expected to grow at the 
expected inflation of 1,12%. This results in an average annual revenue growth of 
around 2% until 2027.  
Peru - domestic 2016 2019 2022 2025 2030
Market Passengers (mln) 10,8 13,8 14,4 15,9 17,9
Market Share 61,4% 62,2% 60,0% 49,0% 45,0%
LATAM Passengers (mln) 6,6 8,6 8,6 7,8 8,1
Average Fare (US-cents) 8,6 8,1 8,2 8,4 8,9
Revenue in USD (bln) 0,52 0,57 0,57 0,54 0,59  
Exhibit 43: Peru – domestic - Forecast 
Colombia - domestic 2016 2019 2022 2025 2030
Market Passengers (mln) 26,5 29,5 30,7 34,0 38,1
Market Share 18,4% 20,1% 23,0% 20,0% 20,0%
LATAM Passengers (mln) 4,9 5,9 7,1 6,8 7,6
Average Fare (US-cents) 8,6 8,1 8,2 8,4 8,9
Revenue in USD (bln) 0,39 0,39 0,47 0,47 0,55  
Exhibit 44: Colombia – domestic - 
Forecast 
Regional International 2018 2019 2022 2025 2030
Market Passengers (mln) 23,3 22,5 22,6 25,2 28,6
Market Share 42,0% 41,0% 40,0% 37,0% 35,0%
LATAM Passengers (mln) 9,8 9,2 9,1 9,3 10,0
Average Fare (US-cents) 9,0 8,5 8,7 8,9 9,5
Revenue in USD (bln) 2,47 2,34 2,35 2,50 2,84  












Long-Haul International: This segment is substantially different than the 
previous. Most Low-Cost airlines only operate one short-haul narrow-body plane 
type (either Airbus A320s or Boeing 737s), meaning LCCs are typically unable to 
directly fly “point-to-point” long-haul distances between continents. Hence, only 
Classic Carriers with wide-body aircrafts have typically been able to serve such 
routes. However, some Low Cost Carriers are studying the possibility of using the 
most recent version of the Boeing 737 Max to perform long-haul flights. A direct 
example of this is Gol planning to launch flights to the U.S. from Brazil, using this 
type of aircraft. In general, LATAM is perceived to still be facing in this segment 
mostly foreign competition in the future. In this segment, LATAM is expected to 
maintain its position and market share. This is also supported by the strategic 
partnership between Delta and LATAM. Therefore, the company will effectively 
grow along the passenger demand, which is expected to grow at a CAGR of 4%. 
Given the average fare increase, assumed to be at inflation (1,12%), this is the 
only segment in which LATAM is expected to grow significantly. Revenues are 
estimated to grow nominally at 4,26% until 2027 and then at 3,14% in infinity. 
One should take into account, though, that all those market share assumptions 
are starting in 2022, as we believe that LATAM’s competition is hindered in their 
expansion due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The concrete impacts of the COVID-
19 crisis on the company’s figures in 2020 and 2021 are described in the 
dedicated chapter.  
As LATAM sells its tickets in all of their operating regions, except for Brazil, as 
dollar denominated or directly linked to the US Dollar, we did not convert the 
revenues into the country’s underlying currency and furthermore used the US 
inflation estimate in the price assumptions. However, its Brazilian domestic 
segment inherits a foreign exchange risk, which is accounted for. In order to be 
aligned with the macroeconomic assumptions, the Brazilian revenue was 
forecasted in Reais with Brazilian inflation estimates and then converted back 
into USD dollar amounts, using estimated future exchange rates. 
Cargo: Considering the current situation, it is uncertain how the short- to 
medium-term of this industry will be affected and thus, even though the trade 
relationships between Latin America and North America14 (as Chile and 
Colombia are expected to increase their exports to the U.S.A., with perishables 
good, such as salmon and flower) and Europe15 (the European Union is Latin 
America’s second largest air trade partner16) are expected to continue to 
 
14 Boeing estimates an annual growth of 4,1% of RTKs in cargo operations between North America and Latin America 
until 2038 
15 Boeing estimates an annual growth of 4% of RTKs in cargo operations between Europe and Latin America until 2038 
16 After the United States of America 
Long-Haul International 2016 2019 2022 2025 2030
LATAM Passengers (mln) 6,1 6,3 6,1 7,0 7,9
Average Fare (US-cents) 5,6 5,6 5,8 6,0 6,3
Revenue in USD (bln) 2,13 2,34 2,33 2,74 3,26  
Exhibit 46: Long-Haul International 
Forecast 
Cargo 2016 2019 2022 2025 2030
ATKs (millions) 6 704 6 357 6 433 6 959 7 776
RTKs (millions) 3 466 3 526 3 568 3 860 4 313
Tons Transported (thousands) 944 904 915 989 1 106
Average Fare per ton per km 0,32 0,30 0,30 0,31 0,33
Revenues ($ billion) 1,11 1,06 1,08 1,20 1,42  
Exhibit 47: Cargo Revenue Forecast 
 
  








improve. LATAM’s cargo-only flights are in these regions, along with two South 
American destinations. The main driver behind such improvements will be the 
economic development of the Latin American countries. Consequentially, we feel 
GDP is the strongest driver for LATAM’s results in this industry, also considering 
the previously depicted relationship between trade, real GDP growth, and RTK 
growth (Exhibits 19 and 20).  
Hence, cargo tons transported and RTKs grow every year at the average real 
GDP growth rate of Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Colombia, and Chile, 
weighted according to each country’s contribution to the total. The average fare 
grows annually by 1,12%, which is the expected dollar inflation. Additionally, 
cargo accounts for around 10,3% of LATAM’s revenues in 2019, and this number 
is not expected to become more significant to the company, as in 2030 cargo 
revenues are expected to account for 11,6% of the company’s total revenues. 
Once again, all these assumptions only take place from 2022 until perpetuity, as 
2020 and 2021 were calculated separately, in our COVID-19 scenario analysis. 
Other revenue: Other revenue was computed as a percentage of passenger 
revenues, as it typically considers additional services, such as loyalty program 
fees or baggage fees. In 2019, this amounted to 2,67% of passenger revenue. 
The general target of airlines is to reach 10% in ancillary revenue. We believe 
that this amount will gradually increase up to 3,8% in 2027 due to the strategic 
partnership with Delta Airlines, which achieved around 9% in the last 3 years. 
From 2027 onwards, it is assumed to remain constant. 
Costs 
Wages & Benefits: Firstly, wages were divided into Brazilian wages and rest of 
the company. Then, expected wage costs were calculated using the Employee 
per Plane metric. LATAM has been decreasing the number of employees per 
plane over the last few years (it currently has 124 employees per plane, a 
number that has decreased, on average, 5,27% per year since 2014, but it is still 
higher than the average of its peers, which sits at 114). Historically, LATAM has 
not been as efficient on its employee expenses as its competitors and the overall 
industry. In 2015, wage expenses accounted to 20,8% of Revenues (competitors 
16,0%)17 and employees per plane equalled 152 (competitors 101), whereas in 
2019, wage expenses reflected 17,4% of revenues (competitors 16,2%). 
Given its new partnership with Delta (currently at 102 employees per plane), and 
LATAM’s increasing efficiency and digitalisation of processes (such as the 
increased self-check-in offering at airports, which requires less employees), it is 
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Exhibit 48: Employees per plane, 
Source: Own calculations; Peer 
Companies’ annual reports 
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Exhibit 49: Employee Cost Forecasts, 
Source: Own calculations 
 
  








expected that LATAM will look to further decrease the number of employees per 
plane, and a reduction of 2 per year is assumed until 2026, after which the 
number (112 employees per plane, the peer average) is held constant.  
Wage per employee equalled $43,010 in 2019 (with competitors sitting at  
$37,062) and the value is assumed to grow at the respective inflation (BRL and 
USD, depending on the region), with BRL-denominated wages converted to 
USD, using the respective end-of-year exchange rate. This cost is expected to 
grow as a decreasing percentage of revenues, and, in 2030, it is expected to be 
16,4% of the total revenues.  
Fuel: Comparing fuel costs to its industry peers, it is observable that LATAM 
pays almost identical fuel costs per ASK18 (in US-cents) to that of its peers. In 
2019, LATAM paid 1,96 US-cents per ASK, whilst the industry average was 1,99. 
Fuel expenses were forecasted by multiplying fuel costs per RSK19, with total 
RSK being taken directly from our revenue forecast. Fuel costs per RSK were 
calculated using the average oil price (which is assumed as a substitute of jet 
fuel price) times Gallon per RSK. The amount of current oil price forecasts is 
limited. We based our assumption on a mixture between the Worldbank Oil price 
forecast (October 2019) and the EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration) 
forecast (April 2020). Unfortunately, the EIA only predicts for the next 2 years 
and therefore we performed a linear interpolation after 2021, using the 
Worldbank estimates. Furthermore, we did not use the estimated oil price of 33 
$/bbl by the EIA in 2020, as LATAM already had hedged 41% of their 2020 fuel 
consumption and is therefore now facing estimated hedging losses of $ 306 
million. We incorporated those hedging losses directly in the fuel costs, as we 
estimated a higher average oil price for LATAM based on their hedging ratio, 
which amounts ultimately to $ 44/bbl. In the Gallon per RSK metric we applied a 
proportional reduction of 21% per every new A320neo family aircraft, as these 
are significantly more fuel efficient than its predecessors. This translates to a 
cumulative efficiency gain of 9% in 2030, which saves $ 242 million in that year. 
Ultimately, this leads to Fuel expenses of 2,15 US-cents per ASK in 2030. 
For a further assessment of the impact of the variation of oil prices on the value 
of LATAM Airlines, a sensitivity analysis was performed, and will be addressed 
later on this report. 
Maintenance: Maintenance costs are assumed to depend on three factors: 
hours flown per plane, the average age of the fleet, and inflation20. As LATAM 
 
18 Available Seat-Kilometres 
19 Revenue Seat-Kilometres 
20 IATA – “Maintenance Costs for Ageing Aircraft” 
 
Exhibit 51: Fuel costs measured as 
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Exhibit 52: Oil Price Forecast, Source: 
EIA, Worldbank, own estimations 
Fuel Costs 2016 2019 2022 2025 2030
Fuel Costs (bln) 2,06 2,93 2,61 3,16 3,70
% of Revenue 22,3% 28,4% 26,9% 30,0% 30,3%
Oil Price (USD/gallon) 1,02 1,43 1,26 1,52 1,65
Gallons per 1000km 2,767 2,623 2,576 2,504 2,458  
Exhibit 53: Oil Price Forecast, Source: 
EIA, Worldbank, own estimations 
Wages & Benefits Costs 2016 2019 2022 2025 2030
Wages & Benefits (bln) 1,95 1,79 1,66 1,74 2,00
% of Revenue 21,1% 17,4% 17,1% 16,6% 16,4%
Employees 45.916 41.729 41.219 41.876 45.457
Cost per Employee 42.494 43.010 43.976 45.465 48.061
Employees per Plane 138 124 116 112 112  
Exhibit 50: Employee costs forecast 
Maintenance Expenses 2016 2019 2022 2025 2030
Maintenance Costs (bln) -0,37 -0,44 -0,46 -0,46 -0,50
% of Revenue 4,0% 4,3% 4,8% 4,3% 4,1%
Flown hours per plane 2.550 2.748 2.836 2.868 2.983
Maintenance Cost per 
Hour Flown -144 -162 -163 -160 -154  
Exhibit 54: Maintenance costs - forecast 
 
  








Airlines intends to have a relatively young fleet (currently at 9 years), and it has 
been able to keep it constant during several periods in the past, we assumed the 
average fleet of the planes to be constant at 10 years during the forecasted 
periods, since no planes will be acquired nor retired in 2020 due to the COVID-19 
pandemic. Thus, the real costs per hour flown will initially be held constant and 
the only determinants of this cost are the hours flown per plane (as seen on 
Exhibit 55) and the US Dollar Inflation, assumed to be constant at 1,12%. 
Nevertheless, starting in 2021, a proportional reduction of 9,4%21 was included 
for every new aircraft from the Airbus A320neo family that replaces one from the 
Airbus A320ceo family. Exhibit 54 presents the evolution of the Maintenance 
Costs until 2030. Furthermore, LATAM Airlines has just initiated (end of 2019) a 
new drone-based maintenance process Donecle UAV solution for automatic 
aircraft inspection of larger maintenance checks of the A320 fleet, which severely 
cuts the time needed to assess an aircraft (estimated to be translated into a 95% 
time saving22) and the amount of labour needed. However, it is still early to 
assess the true cost-cutting potential of this measure.  
Other expenses: A comparison with other airlines in the other expenses section 
needs to be done with caution. Firstly, a cross-continent FSC23 comparison may 
be misleading, as the United States and the EU have higher pricing levels than 
South America. Values are therefore higher for foreign airlines (LATAM’S 
CASK24: 6,5 vs. US FSC’s CASK: 9,2; LATAM’s RASK: 6,0 vs. US FSC’s: 10,3). 
A comparison with the regional competitors also has its shortfalls, due to the 
different business model as a LCC’s key objective is to cut costs (South 
American LCC CASK: 6,2; RASK: 7,5). Avianca is the only carrier that operates 
in Latin America, and has a comparable size and business model to LATAM 
(Avianca CASK: 8,4; RASK: 7,2). However, Avianca is under financial distress 
and has been unprofitable for a long time. Hence, other expenses were 
forecasted based on historical developments and statements of the 
management. Over the past 4 years, other expenses were decreasing measured 
as a percentage of revenues and per ASK (other expenses in 2016 were 33,1% 
of revenues, and in 2019, 29,6%; other expenses per ASK were 2,26 in 2016: 
and 2,05 in 2019). Furthermore, the management states to continue to reduce 
costs. We believe this is realistic and there is potential left when comparing to 
Azul & Gol (Other expenses as a % of Revenue 2019: 22%, per ASK: 1.6). 
 
21 Flight Global – “A320 NEO to have $7-8 million price premium”; Pratt & Whitney – “The Pure Power PW1000G 
Engine”; the new A320 NEOs have a lower 20% engine maintenance cost; engine maintenance cost accounts for, on 
average, 47% of the total maintenance costs of an aircraft, per IATA – “Airline Maintenance Cost Executive 
Commentary, Edition 2019” 
22 EBV – “Donecle revolutionizes aircraft inspection and it’s awesome” 
23 Full Service Carrier 
24 Cost per ASK 
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Maintenance Costs ($ million) Hours Flown per Plane per Year
 
Exhibit 55: Maintenance Costs and 
hours flown per plane (secondary axis). 
Source: Own estimations 
Other costs (bln) 2016 2018 2019 2022 2025 2030
Comissions to agents -0,27 -0,22 -0,22 -0,21 -0,23 -0,26
Other rental & landing fees -1,08 -1,21 -1,28 -1,16 -1,27 -1,47
Passenger Services -0,29 -0,28 -0,26 -0,25 -0,27 -0,31
Other administrative costs -1,06 -0,85 -0,83 -0,77 -0,84 -0,98
Other operating costs -0,36 -0,38 -0,46 -0,42 -0,45 -0,52
Total Other Expenses -3,06 -2,94 -3,05 -2,81 -3,06 -3,54
% of Revenue 33,1% 29,0% 29,6% 29,0% 29,0% 29,0% 
Exhibit 56: Other costs - forecast 
 
  








However, as LATAM still operates in its International segment a different 
business model than Azul & Gol, LATAM is unlikely to achieve their figures. 
Therefore we incorporated only a slight efficiency increase in other expenses, 
which account for 29% of revenues in perpetuity. We feel comfortable with using 
only a slight increase here as we are already including a stronger efficiency 
increase in the Wages & Benefits expenses. 
NWC 
Operating Cash was assumed to be 5,18% of revenues as this was the 
estimated minimum of our peer group in recent years. Regarding the Cash 
Conversion Cycle, and namely the DPO, DIO and DSO25 we assumed that 
LATAM will get closer to the values of its peer group. LATAM has higher DIO, but 
especially significantly higher DSO and DPO than the global aviation industry 
average, which can be explained by their location, as developing countries in 
South America tend to function less efficiently. Therefore, we strongly overweight 
the other Latin American airlines in our peer group. However, we assumed that 
LATAM will tend more to its competitors in DPO (currently 98; peer group 65), 
which goes down to 70 until 2027. DIO (LATAM: 15.7, peer group: 9.9) will 
decrease to 10 until 2027 and DSO (LATAM: 44, peer group: 29) will shrink to 35. 
These values will then be constant until perpetuity. 
Invested Capital 
CAPEX: PP&E was split into own airplanes, leased airplanes, buildings, land and 
equipment. Own aircrafts PP&E were forecasted by the outstanding orders and 
future commitments until 2025 by using market prices, which effectively vary to 
list prices. On average, Airbus and Boeing sell their planes to commercial airlines 
with a discount of roughly 50%. We used the individual average discounts per 
plane on the list prices, albeit with a 10% reduction, to highlight LATAM’s 
relatively low bargaining power, when compared to other major airlines. 
Furthermore, its orders are usually in less quantities than its major peers’, and 
usually the higher the order, the higher the discount. Market prices were 
assumed to grow each year from 2019 with inflation, 1,12%.  
After 2025, we estimated their fleet additions to be the sum of necessary 
replacements per year, which amounts to 8, and the necessary increase 
regarding the additional RSK due to more passengers transported, which we 
estimate to be on average around 3 per year. The depreciation is manually 
calculated by the depreciation in 2019 plus the variation steaming from 
purchases and retirements of airplanes. PP&E is on average decreasing during 
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Exhibit 59: NWC forecast 
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Exhibit 61: Invested Capital forecast, 









Airbus A320-NEO 6 110.600 45,00% 60.830
Airbus A321-NEO 4 129.500 44,00% 72.520
Airbus A350-900 2 317.400 41,00% 187.266  
Exhibit 60: Plane assumptions 
2016 2019 2022 2025 2030
NWC ($ bn) -2,48 -3,44 -3,14 -3,12 -3,12
DSO 44 44 40 37 35
DIO 11 16 11 10 10
DPO 73 99 76 70 70 
Exhibit 58: NWC assumptions 
2018 2019 2020 2022 2025 2030
EBITDA ($ million) 2 020 2 091 427 2 157 2 110 2 465
EBITDA Margin 19,9% 20,3% 9,1% 22,2% 20,0% 20,2%
NOPLAT ($ million) 558 545 -612 530 438 561
NOPLAT Margin 5,5% 5,3% -13,1% 5,5% 4,2% 4,6%  
Exhibit 57: Projected EBITDA & margin, 
and NOPLAT & margin 












the first 5 years, to equal a total amount of $11,7 billion. In the terminal value 
period, the amount of own aircrafts are increasing at the underlying real GDP rate 
of 2%, which also reflects the increase in transported passengers and ASK. 
Simplifying other items in the PP&E, including leasing, were assumed to grow at 
a rate that the combination between depreciation and increase in Net PP&E, 
meaning the CAPEX increases 3% annually, which is the combination of capacity 
and inflation growth. This makes LATAM come closer to its peers with a Fixed 
Asset Turnover ratio of 1,02 in 2030 (0,8 in 2019) compared to 1,3 of its peers. 
Intangibles & Goodwill: Intangible Assets were assumed to grow at 2%, the 
underlying long-term real GDP growth rate. Goodwill was assumed to remain 
constant, which is in line with the development in the last 5 years. 
Unlevered Cost of Capital 
With the APV method, LATAM’s unlevered cash flows and tax shields are 
evaluated separately. To properly reflect the risk in LATAM’s unlevered cash 
flows, an unlevered cost of capital was computed to discounted them, using as 
inputs: an unlevered beta, calculated through unlevering both the company’s and 
the peers’ raw betas; and a beta of debt, calculated through the cost of debt, and 
used on the previous calculation.  
The raw beta was obtained by regressing LATAM’s excess returns on the US 
Dollar risk free rate against the MSCI World’s excess returns on the same rate. 
The chosen period comprised the weeks starting in 11/01/2019 until 28/02/2020. 
This specific data set was chosen based on two major rationales: on one hand, 
airline shares are usually very illiquid, meaning the majority of airlines’ shares 
are not traded actively, meaning its returns may not be as sensitive to the 
market26, as one would expect and thus get betas which underestimate the true 
systematic risk of this industry (furthermore, the same author suggests there is 
empirical evidence of a positive relation between β values and trading activity). 
On the other hand, this period is the one that better represents the forward-
looking risk of the industry, which will be severely changed with the COVID-19 
pandemic. By having a larger estimation period the beta would smooth the effect 
of this pandemic and underestimate the “new” real systematic risk affecting 
LATAM, but capturing further observations after the aforementioned period would 
overestimate such risk, after the drastic movements in the share prices of most of 
the companies within our peer group (including LATAM) in March, which was 
also not representative of the future of the industry. Having weekly observations 
allowed us to have enough observations (60) for a relevant regression, which 
 
26 Sheelah Turner, “An Evaluation of Airline β Values and Their Application in Calculating the Cost of Capital”, 
Journal of Air Transport Management 9 (July 2003) 
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Exhibit 62: LATAM’s excess returns 












resulted in a confidence interval of [0,85; 2,53]. Such width of the confidence 
interval led us to choose to rely on the industry peers for the beta. The betas 
were then unlevered according to each company’s market D/E ratio and beta of 
debt. 
The beta of debt was obtained using each company’s cost of debt (we assumed 
the values from Bloomberg for each peer, and then transformed it into dollars) 
and the CAPM model, with a USD-denominated risk free rate (0,70 %27), as this 
is the functional currency of LATAM’s cash flows, and a Market Risk Premium of 
5,50%28, using the MSCI World as our market index, denominated in USD . 
LATAM’s cost of debt was computed using its most recent debt issuance (a 7 
year bond with a 7,049% yield to maturity) and a discount representing LATAM’s 
relatively high credit risk (B1). Hence, a seven-year average cumulative 
probability of default of 17,89%29. Using a recovery rate of 53,9%30, we get a cost 
of debt of 5,952%.  
The resulting industry unlevered beta was 1,15, leading us to an unlevered cost 
of capital of 7,02%, using the same CAPM model. 
The tax shields were also discounted at the unlevered cost of capital, as the 
Debt level is not constant throughout the analysed period. 
COVID-19 
With the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in late 2019, which started in 
Wuhan, China, uncertain times loom over the airline industry horizon. 2020 is 
poised to be a catastrophic year for the industry, with 2021 likely to be a recovery 
year. The question is, which airlines will be able to recover from this slump, and 
in which moulds.  
The airline industry is expected to lose $314 bn in passenger revenue in 202031, 
with a 48% decrease in RPKs on a year-on-year basis. The Americas are 
expected to be the “least” affected regions in the world, with North America 
decreasing 36% y-o-y, implying a loss of $64 bn in passenger revenue and Latin 
America decreasing 49% y-o-y, losing $18 bn in passenger revenue. 
Given South America and, consequently, LATAM Airlines were barely affected by 
this pandemic in the first two months of the year, only in March did the real 
effects start to be felt, as seen on Exhibits 63 through 65. This can be explained 
 
27 Source: CNBC 
28 McKinsey Valuation Book 
29 Source: Moody’s 
30 Source: Moody’s 
31 IATA – “Updated Impact Assessment” (14/04/2020) 
 
LATAM’s Credit Rating was 
downgraded in March, following a 
statement of the Chilean 
government denying any financial 
aid to the company 
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Exhibit 63: ASK Comparison  
(thousands) 












by the fact that LATAM Airlines doesn’t have any air connections to East Asia 
(the most affected region of the world during the first two months of the year). 
Due to the COVID-19 outbreak in Europe, North America, and South America, 
countries in these continents started to impose international and domestic travel 
restrictions, reducing it to the strictly necessary. This prompted LATAM to 
cancel 95% of its passenger operations in late March, a measure which is 
expected to be maintained, at the very least, until the end of May 2020.  
In order to assess what the impact of such situation will be on LATAM’s revenues 
and cash flows, a scenario analysis was conducted, with 4 scenarios32 
considered: Scenario 1 assumes a U-shaped recovery which would see a 
gradual reduction of the lockdown and re-opening of the international borders 
over the next 6 to 9 months. Scenario 2 assumes a slower U-shaped recovery 
extending to 2021, in which the consumer confidence in traveling and the 
consequent demand would take longer to recover, meaning international leisure 
travel would be the hardest hit. Scenario 3 assumes an L-shaped recovery 
which would see a decrease in the future growth rate of the industry, comparing 
to the effects before the crisis, as there is no guarantee that demand will ever 
return to pre-COVID-19 levels; and Scenario 4 assumes a W-shaped recovery 
which would assume some recovery in 2020 before the outbreak resurges 
towards the end of the year and causes a 2nd wave of lockdown, extending to 
2021.  
Furthermore, in all scenarios it was assumed for every scenario that domestic 
markets would recover faster than international, due to the fact that consumer 
confidence in traveling to other countries or planning trips ahead will mean 
tourism will take longer to recover. Furthermore, and as previously mentioned, 
cross-country business travel is expected to decrease as working from distance 
is becoming the new reality. Moreover, and given the thoroughly likely economic 
recession that will follow the pandemic, it is likely that demand for leisure 
international travel will decrease, as consumers try to avoid unnecessary 
expenses.  
Moreover, economic growth in the region is also expected to recover by 2022, 
with most of the recovery happening in 2021. In 2020, the revenue-weighted 
average real GDP growth is expected to decrease by 4,69%33, and then increase 
3,38%34 in 2021, with a further 2,71% growth rate in 2022.  
 
32 BCG – “The Post-COVID-19 Flight Plan for Airlines”; IATA – “Updated Impact Assessment” (14/04/2020) 
33 IMF – World Economic Outlook – April 2020 
34 IMF – World Economic Outlook – April 2020 
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Exhibit 64: RPK comparison 
(thousands) 
Source: Company data 
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Exhibit 65: Passenger comparison 
(thousands) 
Source: Company data 
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Argentina -5,7% 4,4% 2,28% 3,10% 3,20% 3,20%
Brazil -5,3% 2,9% 2,36% 2,41% 2,26% 2,26%
Chile -2,4% 3,7% 3,27% 3,26% 3,19% 3,19%
Colombia -4,5% 5,3% 3,75% 3,75% 3,75% 3,75%
Ecuador -6,3% 3,9% 2,72% 2,51% 2,51% 2,51%
Peru -4,5% 5,2% 3,99% 3,90% 3,76% 3,76%
Weighted Average -4,69% 3,38% 2,70% 2,75% 2,62% 2,61%  
 
Exhibit 66: GDP growth average, 
weighted according to revenues 
 
  








We believe Scenario 2 to be the most likely one, and thus attributed a 50% 
probability to it. This is because the lockdown measures are gradually starting to 
ease, meaning demand for domestic flights is expected to increase as countries 
re-start their activities. Furthermore, in LATAM’s biggest market, Brazil, the 
president, Jair Bolsonaro, firmly opposes the present lockdown measures35, 
meaning the country could reopen its air space faster than expected. However, 
international travel is expected to take much longer to recover. This is because 
not only are people getting more used to work remotely, meaning there will be 
less need for international business travel after the pandemic is over, but also 
because customers will feel less safe in the first few months after the pandemic.  
Scenario 1 was attributed a 20% probability of occurrence, as it is looking 
increasingly less likely, especially in comparison with Scenario 2. Scenarios 3 
and 4 were both attributed a probability of 15%. Scenario 3 is attributed this 
probability based on the fact that air demand quickly recovered to pre-crisis 
growth in previous pandemics36. However, the severity and scale of the COVID-
19 pandemic appears to be much higher than any past event, especially given its 
global scale. Scenario 4 hinges on the possibility that the “return to normal” after 
lockdown is not done efficiently, especially in less developed and more populous 
countries, such as Brazil. Furthermore, the virus is still widely unknown, including 
its most basic characteristics, such as its origin and the environments in which it 
thrives. Hence, we cannot say that, even if the lockdown measures and the 
“return to normal” are properly enforced, the virus will not reappear.  
Parallelly, another Scenario Analysis for the Load Factors was built, due to the 
possibility of airlines having to implement social distancing measures inside 
their aircraft. 3 possibilities were considered here: no social distancing measures, 
with a probability of 45%, social distancing measures until the end of Q2 of 2021, 
with a probability of 40%, and social distancing measures until mid-2022 (this 
scenario assumes the same probability as Scenario 4 – 15% –, as we only think 
this would only be reasonable should the pandemic resurge towards the end of 
2020 and/or beginning of 2021). 
Applying a probability-weighted average to the Scenarios, it is expected that 
LATAM’s total revenues for 2020 will be 54,5% lower than in 2019. In 2021, we 
expect a 53,8% increase in overall revenues, fuelled by the recovery in most of 
the Scenarios in the domestic markets and the continued increased demand, 
especially in the domestic Brazilian market. Recovery from COVID-19 will 
continue in 2022, and it will be total in domestic markets as it is expected that, by 
 
35 Aljazeera – “Brazil’s president pushes for end to lockdown” 
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Exhibit 67: Total Revenues and 
Passenger Revenues during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
Source: Own estimations 
 
  








the end of 2022, domestic demand will be fully recovered. International demand 
is assumed to be fully recovered by 2023. 
Regarding cargo, RTKs are also expected to decrease in 2020, as GDP growth 
will be negative across all relevant South American countries. However, these 
lower RTKs (4,69% decrease y-o-y) will likely be compensated by the higher 
cargo fares due to lack of capacity, tariffs and increased border controls, and 
the necessity for more safety equipment to ensure the feasibility of cargo 
transport in such times (we assumed a fare increase of 33% in 2020, and a 
gradual decrease until pre-crisis levels in 2022). Hence, cargo revenues are 
actually expected to increase in 2020, and then decrease until 2022. 
In our COVID-19 Scenario Analysis, we also addressed employee costs, as 
LATAM announced a reduction of 50% in the wages of its 43,000 employees for 
at least 3 months, starting in mid-March37, with the duration of the pay-cuts 
varying according to each Scenario. This means that LATAM is expected to only 
pay 85% of wages in 2020, with the values in 2021 and beyond back to “normal”. 
FCF decreases by 79% in 2020, to $281 million. It should be noted, however, 
that this is due to Invested Capital being exceptionally low in 2020 (a decrease of 
33% from 2019). This is because LATAM deferred around 90%38 of the 
investments it had planned for 2020, including the purchase of any new aircraft. 
FCF in 2021 will increase, but only by 5% (to $295 million), as the increase in 
investing cash flow for the year somewhat offsets the increase in operating cash 
flow. 
Valuation 
In our last forecasted year 2030 our model identifies an EBITDA margin of 
20,18%, an EBIT margin of 6,6%, and a NOPLAT margin of 4,6%. We observe a 
revenue growth of 3,14%.   
Based on the APV approach and the mentioned figures, our model discloses an 
operational EV of $ 11,42 billion, including the Tax Shield benefits. Adding the 
Non-Core Invested Capital of $ 265,2 million and subtracting the Net Financial 
Assets of $ 9,94 billion, we arrive at an Equity Value of $ 1,75 billion, which 
translates into a share price of $ 2,88 (compared to the current share price of $ 
2,58). This is our estimated the going-concern value. However, we believe that 
LATAM faces the risk of defaulting. LATAM officials stated the company has 
 
37 Reuters – “LATAM Airlines to cut pay by 50% to its 43,000 employees” 
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Cargo Revenues ($ billion) Average Fare per ton per km ($)
 
Exhibit 68: Cargo Revenues and 
average fares during the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
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Exhibit 70: FCF during the COVID-19 
pandemic (in $ million) 
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NOPLAT ($ million) NOPLAT Margin (%)
 
Exhibit 69: NOPLAT and NOPLAT 
Margin during the COVID-19 pandemic. 












liquidity for 3-4 months.39 With respect to this, a scenario analysis was created 
with the scenario of a Liquidation and Chapter 11 restructuring. Overall, we 
assign a probability of 20% that LATAM has to declare bankruptcy within the next 
year. With the aid package of the Brazilian government it is increasingly likely 
that the Chilean government will follow. Considering this 20% probability results 
in an expected share price of $ 2,35. This reflects a potential annualized 
return of -14,2% on the stock. As LATAM announced that, due to the COVID-19 
crisis, its dividend for 2020 has been cancelled, this reflects the Total 
Shareholder Return for the holding period.  
Multiples 
We performed a multiple analysis to understand the market perception of the 
industry and cross-check with the results obtained from intrinsic valuation. 
However, a relative valuation relies on using comparable peers and assumes a 
correct valuation of the industry by the market, which has, historically, not always 
been the case40. We used P/E and EV/EBITDA multiples based on our peer 
group41. Using numbers from December 2019 (pre-crisis), results in an average 
equity value of $3,5 billion and a share price of $5,8. Relying on current 
multiples of April leads to an Equity value of $601 million and a Share price of 
$1,0. 
Key Risks 
▪ Operating in South America 
South America has been (and still is) synonym with high inflation countries. 
Argentina is currently experiencing a hyperinflation crisis and Brazil had inflation 
over 14% as recently as 2003. Even though LATAM Airlines sells most of its 
services in USD or USD equivalents, it still has a substantial part of its revenues 
(around 27% in 2019) coming from the Brazilian domestic passenger market and 
denominated in Brazilian Reais. As such, an economic crisis in Brazil could 
massively devalue more than a quarter of LATAM’s revenues and have a 
thoroughly negative impact on its revenues. A scenario analysis to reflect the 
risk of operating in these countries was built and incorporated directly into the 
DCF analysis, based on past Brazilian recessions, with the revenues presented 
being the statistically expected revenues. A probability of 13,04% was 
attributed to this scenario, extrapolated by analysing the number of quarters in 
 
39 Reuters: Latam Airlines will need government loans to recover after crisis 
40 For instance, the “Dot Com Bubble” 
41 Multiple Peer group: Gol, Azul, Copa, Air Canada, Air France-KLM, United, Delta, Finnair, American and Lufthansa 





Exhibit 72: Multiples Peer Group 


























technical recession since the beginning of 1997, ignoring the Great Financial 
Crisis (as this was a global crisis, and not specific to Brazil). 
▪ Fuel Price Volatility 
The air passenger and cargo industry performance is very dependent on fuel, as 
there are still no feasible substitutes to this material. Given how volatile the price 
of fuel has been in the past few years, and even though LATAM Airlines has 
hedging contracts in place, these might not be sufficient to protect the company 
from massive price hikes, or might hamper the company in cases of massive 
price plummeting (such as the situation the world was experiencing at the time 
this report was written). A sensitivity analysis was performed on the possible 
effects of fuel price change, and how fares would have to change to ensure the 
company would remain financially healthy. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Firstly, a sensitivity analysis of the target price relatively to the unlevered cost of 
capital and terminal value was performed. The long term growth rate is uncertain. 
Although the overall market is expected to grow above 3%, which is mostly due 
to tourism, LATAM Airlines might not grow as much because of their reliance on 
business travelling. COVID-19 might have a permanent negative effect on that 
segment, which reduces the growth rate. A growth rate of 2,4% would result in a 
lower going-concern share price of $1,27. 
Moreover, another sensitivity analysis was performed, this time based on a 
permanent change in fuel costs and average fares (on top of inflation), ceteris 
paribus. In the long-term, rising fuel costs are rolled over to customers. On 
average, fares have to increase by around 50% of the fuel cost increase to 
maintain the same share price, which seems realistic. However, in the short term 
a price shock could be problematic as airfare pricing is typically based on 
demand and not costs.  
Recommendation 
Given all the aspects affecting the valuation of the company described above, our 
final target share price of $2,35, together with the fact that LATAM will not pay a 
dividend in 2020, our final recommendation to investors is that they SELL their 
positions on LATAM Airlines. The annualized return on the stock, considering the 
current price of $2,58, is -14,2%, with a holding period of 223 days, or 0,61 years. 
0,00 6,6% 6,80% 7,02% 7,20%
2,40% 2,63 1,95 1,27 0,77
2,80% 3,32 2,57 1,82 1,27
3,12% 4,00 3,16 2,34 1,74
3,50% 4,97 4,02 3,09 2,40
3,70% 5,59 4,55 3,55 2,81









Exhibit 73: Sensitivity Analysis on rU 
and g 
0,00 -2,00% -1,00% 0,00% 1,00% 2,00%
-3,00% 1,67 2,98 4,29 5,60 6,91
-2,00% 1,02 2,33 3,64 4,95 6,26
-1,00% 0,38 1,69 3,00 4,31 5,62
0,00% -0,27 1,04 2,35 3,66 4,97
1,00% -0,91 0,40 1,71 3,02 4,33
2,00% -1,56 -0,25 1,06 2,37 3,68
3,00% -2,20 -0,89 0,42 1,73 3,03












Change in Average Fare
 
Exhibit 74: Sensitivity Analysis on the 
fuel price changes and the 
subsequent change in average fares 
 
  








Furthermore, we also decided to not take into consideration the multiples 
analysis, as in uncertain times like these, it is not entirely accurate with the true 
valuation of the companies in this industry. 
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Core Assets 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 20182018 IFRS 162019 IFRS 16 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Operating Cash 595 663 624 506 476 508 518 518 522 237 365 491 504 520 533 548 563 581 599 618
Trade and other accounts receivable 1.418 1.633 1.379 797 1.108 1.214 1.163 1.163 1.244 540 811 1.064 1.064 1.069 1.068 1.069 1.067 1.101 1.136 1.171
Accounts receivable from related entities 15 1 0 0 1 3 3 3 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Inventories 177 231 266 225 241 237 279 279 354 140 186 228 225 222 231 237 244 251 259 267
Tax Assets 96 82 101 64 65 78 69 69 29 13 21 28 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
Other non-financial current assets 284 336 248 330 212 221 321 290 313 142 213 287 294 303 311 320 329 339 350 361
Operating Current Assets 2.585 2.946 2.617 1.922 2.104 2.261 2.353 2.323 2.483 1.092 1.615 2.116 2.136 2.163 2.192 2.224 2.254 2.325 2.397 2.472
Trade and other accounts payables 1.690 1.558 1.489 1.484 1.593 1.695 1.674 1.674 2.223 935 1.263 1.572 1.587 1.598 1.616 1.657 1.706 1.759 1.814 1.870
Accounts Payable to related entities 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tax Liabilities 15 12 18 19 14 4 4 4 12 3 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 8
Deferred Revenues 2.459 2.817 2.921 2.696 2.869 2.849 2.975 2.975 3.540 3.540 3.540 3.540 3.540 3.540 3.540 3.540 3.540 3.540 3.540 3.540
Other non-financial current liabilities 126 133 120 66 107 133 125 125 146 76 105 134 139 144 150 154 158 163 168 173
Operating Current Liabilities 4.290 4.519 4.548 4.266 4.584 4.682 4.778 4.778 5.921 4.554 4.913 5.253 5.273 5.289 5.312 5.358 5.412 5.470 5.530 5.592
Net Operating Current Assets (Operating Working Capital)-1.705 -1.573 -1.931 -2.344 -2.480 -2.421 -2.424 -2.455 -3.439 -3.462 -3.298 -3.137 -3.137 -3.126 -3.120 -3.134 -3.158 -3.145 -3.133 -3.120
Property and Equipment 11.807 10.983 10.773 10.939 10.498 10.065 9.953 12.502 12.920 11.802 11.359 11.424 11.278 11.384 11.374 11.306 11.419 11.548 11.692 11.852
Intangible assets other than goodwill 2.382 2.093 1.880 1.321 1.610 1.617 1.441 1.441 1.448 1.463 1.492 1.522 1.552 1.583 1.615 1.647 1.680 1.714 1.748 1.783
Total Fixed Assets 14.189 13.076 12.653 12.260 12.108 11.683 11.394 13.943 14.368 13.264 12.851 12.946 12.831 12.967 12.989 12.954 13.099 13.262 13.440 13.635
Goodwill 4.213 3.728 3.313 2.281 2.710 2.673 2.294 2.294 2.210 2.210 2.210 2.210 2.210 2.210 2.210 2.210 2.210 2.210 2.210 2.210
Accounts Receivable (non-current) 51 101 30 11 8 7 5 5 5 2 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6
Non-current Tax Assets 0 0 18 26 20 18 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other non-financial non-current assets 308 272 343 235 237 221 234 228 205 93 143 193 198 204 209 215 221 228 235 243
Other Operating Assets 359 373 391 272 266 245 240 234 210 95 147 197 203 209 214 220 226 234 241 248
Accounts Payable (non-current) 1.086 923 577 417 359 499 484 529 619 299 408 513 525 535 548 562 578 596 615 634
Other non-financial non-current liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Current Hedge Derivatives 66 66 226 134 25 12 26 26 50 24 37 48 49 50 50 52 53 55 56 58
Non-Current Hedge Derivatives 111 55 28 16 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Operating Liabilities 1.262 1.044 832 567 391 514 510 556 670 322 445 562 573 585 598 613 631 651 671 692
Net Other Operating Assets -904 -671 -441 -295 -125 -268 -270 -322 -460 -227 -298 -364 -371 -376 -384 -393 -405 -417 -430 -444
Operating Invested Capital 15.794 14.559 13.595 11.902 12.214 11.666 10.994 13.460 12.679 11.785 11.464 11.655 11.532 11.675 11.694 11.637 11.746 11.909 12.087 12.281
Non Core Assets
Provisions 1.366 1.150 716 427 425 377 308 308 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292
Other Financial Assets 637 710 650 651 713 560 384 384 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Other non-current Financial Assets 78 72 85 89 102 88 59 59 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Non-current assets and disposal groups held for sale48 2 1 2 337 291 6 6 485 485 485 485 485 485 485 485 485 485 485 485
Non-Operating Assets -604 -366 21 315 727 562 140 140 740 740 740 740 740 740 740 740 740 740 740 740
Current Derivatives not recognized as hedge 4 4 1 0 0 0 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-Current Derivatives not recognized as hedge6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Liabilities included in disposal groups classified as held for sale0 0 0 0 10 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Deferred Taxes 416 364 645 435 531 586 599 513 381 381 381 381 381 381 381 381 381 381 381 381
Employee Benefits 38 46 74 65 82 101 82 82 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
Non-Operating Liabilities 464 415 720 500 624 702 689 603 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 475
Net Non-Operating Invested Capital -1.069 -781 -699 -185 103 -141 -549 -463 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 265
Total Funds Invested 14.725 13.778 12.896 11.717 12.317 11.525 10.445 12.997 12.944 12.050 11.729 11.920 11.797 11.940 11.959 11.902 12.011 12.174 12.352 12.546
Financing
Current Interest Bearing Loans 1.977 1.969 1.397 1.510 1.815 1.289 1.397 1.397 1.421 1.421 1.421 1.421 1.421 1.421 1.421 1.421 1.421 1.466 1.511 1.559
Non-Current Interest Bearing Loans 7.582 7.804 7.361 7.516 6.790 6.603 5.865 5.865 5.772 6.713 6.713 6.413 6.113 5.813 5.513 5.313 5.113 5.273 5.438 5.608
Excess Cash 55 1.322 366 247 473 634 563 563 551 1.377 1.239 846 753 413 153 125 -60 140 345 555
Current Lease Liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 363 414 416 419 423 429 435 443 451 460 469 478 488
Non-Current Lease Liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.495 2.758 2.769 2.789 2.818 2.855 2.898 2.948 3.003 3.062 3.124 3.187 3.253
Equity attributable to the parent company’s equity holders5.112 5.239 4.402 2.857 4.097 4.176 3.667 3.361 3.131 2.110 1.628 1.692 1.734 1.787 1.789 1.840 1.897 1.984 2.083 2.195
Minority Interest 109 88 102 81 89 91 80 80 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2
Total Funds Reconciliation 14.725 13.778 12.896 11.717 12.317 11.525 10.445 12.997 12.944 12.050 11.729 11.920 11.797 11.940 11.959 11.902 12.011 12.174 12.352 12.546  
Appendix 1: Balance Sheet 
 
  































































       
Disclosures and Disclaimers 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 20182018 IFRS 162019 IFRS 16 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
REVENUES 13.028 13.118 12.290 9.953 9.240 9.869 10.129 10.129 10.310 4.692 7.216 9.706 9.962 10.272 10.534 10.836 11.130 11.484 11.844 12.216
growth -54,49% 53,80% 34,51% 2,64% 3,12% 2,55% 2,86% 2,72% 3,17% 3,14% 3,140%
Net Passenger Revenue 11.017 11.062 10.380 8.411 7.878 8.494 8.709 8.709 9.006 3.258 5.831 8.374 8.574 8.821 9.019 9.254 9.479 9.780 10.087 10.403
Net Cargo Revenue 1.940 1.863 1.713 1.329 1.111 1.119 1.186 1.186 1.064 1.344 1.216 1.077 1.114 1.156 1.199 1.244 1.291 1.332 1.374 1.417
Other Operating Revenue 71 193 197 213 251 255 233 233 240 90 169 255 274 295 316 338 360 372 383 395
OPERATING COSTS -12.044 -11.580 -10.967 -8.678 -7.999 -8.448 -8.681 -8.109 -8.219 -4.264 -5.910 -7.549 -7.829 -8.102 -8.424 -8.639 -8.896 -9.173 -9.457 -9.751
Wages and Benefits -2.596 -2.493 -2.350 -2.073 -1.951 -2.024 -1.820 -1.820 -1.795 -1.394 -1.638 -1.660 -1.682 -1.698 -1.744 -1.781 -1.834 -1.888 -1.944 -2.001
Aircraft fuel -4.780 -4.414 -4.167 -2.651 -2.057 -2.319 -2.983 -2.983 -2.929 -1.242 -1.803 -2.607 -2.798 -2.961 -3.163 -3.251 -3.372 -3.477 -3.587 -3.699
Commissions to agents -417 -409 -366 -303 -269 -252 -223 -223 -222 -101 -155 -209 -214 -221 -227 -233 -240 -247 -255 -263
Other Rental and Landing Fees -1.377 -1.373 -1.327 -1.110 -1.077 -1.172 -1.218 -1.207 -1.276 -565 -869 -1.169 -1.200 -1.238 -1.269 -1.305 -1.341 -1.383 -1.427 -1.472
Passenger Services -315 -331 -300 -295 -287 -289 -280 -280 -261 -119 -183 -246 -253 -260 -267 -275 -282 -291 -300 -310
Aircraft Rentals -422 -441 -521 -525 -569 -580 -538 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aircraft maintenance -424 -477 -453 -437 -366 -431 -382 -367 -445 -262 -374 -464 -457 -460 -458 -461 -459 -473 -488 -504
Other Costs which relate to Distribution and Administration-1.539 -1.419 -1.266 -1.053 -1.062 -1.097 -838 -849 -832 -375 -577 -776 -797 -822 -843 -867 -890 -919 -948 -977
Other Operating Expenses -173 -223 -216 -230 -360 -284 -400 -381 -460 -206 -310 -417 -428 -442 -453 -466 -479 -494 -509 -525
EBITDA 984 1.538 1.324 1.276 1.241 1.421 1.447 2.020 2.091 427 1.305 2.157 2.133 2.171 2.110 2.197 2.235 2.311 2.387 2.465
As a % of Revenues 7,55% 11,72% 10,77% 12,82% 13,43% 14,40% 14,29% 19,94% 20,28% 9,11% 18,09% 22,23% 21,41% 21,13% 20,03% 20,28% 20,08% 20,12% 20,15% 20,18%
Depreciation -1.087 -985 -944 -898 -910 -943 -916 -1.307 -1.389 -1.295 -1.302 -1.325 -1.347 -1.377 -1.405 -1.428 -1.461 -1.496 -1.533 -1.570
Amortization of Intangibles 0 -20 -17 -13 -19 -22 -25 -25 -32 -32 -32 -33 -34 -34 -35 -36 -36 -37 -38 -39
Amortization of Goodwill 0 -36 -30 -23 -32 -36 -40 -40 -49 -47 -47 -47 -47 -47 -47 -47 -47 -47 -47 -47
OPERATING PROFIT (EBIT) -103 496 332 341 281 419 466 648 621 -946 -76 752 706 712 623 686 690 730 769 809
As a % of Revenues -0,79% 3,78% 2,71% 3,43% 3,04% 4,25% 4,60% 6,39% 6,02% -20,17% -1,06% 7,75% 7,09% 6,93% 5,92% 6,33% 6,20% 6,36% 6,49% 6,62%
Operating Taxes 23 136 198 -21 165 185 83 90 76 -334 -50 223 209 213 185 207 209 223 235 248
NOPLAT -126 360 134 363 116 234 383 558 545 -612 -26 530 497 500 438 479 481 507 534 561
Non Operating Income -329 -538 -109 -533 47 -26 -105 15 -36 -16 -25 -34 -35 -36 -37 -38 -39 -40 -41 -43
Others Income/(Expense) -329 -538 -109 -533 47 -26 -105 15 -36 -16 -25 -34 -35 -36 -37 -38 -39 -40 -41 -43
Others Non-Operating Revenue 195 148 181 172 287 295 239 239 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121
Non-Operating Income Taxes -27 -78 15 -81 80 69 83 115 23 28 26 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 21 21
OCI 0 -521 -766 -1.361 585 -29 -643 -776 -184 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-Operating Result -108 -833 -709 -1.640 839 172 -591 -637 -122 76 70 63 63 62 61 61 60 59 58 57
Total Income to Investors -233 -473 -575 -1.277 955 406 -208 -79 423 -536 44 593 559 562 499 540 541 566 592 618
Financing
Interest Expense -444 -463 -430 -413 -416 -393 -356 -539 -590 -630 -688 -689 -673 -657 -642 -628 -619 -611 -628 -645
% of previous years' Debt 4,84% 4,40% 4,72% 4,61% 4,57% 4,51% 6,83% 5,83% 6,08% 6,08% 6,08% 6,08% 6,08% 6,08% 6,08% 6,08% 6,08% 6,08% 6,08%
Interest Income 117 73 91 75 75 79 53 53 26 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Tax Shield 65 78 71 76 82 80 82 131 152 158 174 174 170 165 161 157 155 153 157 162
Financial Result -262 -312 -268 -262 -259 -234 -221 -355 -411 -427 -469 -470 -459 -447 -436 -425 -419 -413 -426 -438
Result (excl. Minority Interest) -495 -785 -843 -1.540 696 172 -429 -434 12 -963 -425 123 101 114 63 114 121 153 166 180
Minority Interest 0 -16 -13 12 47 43 18 19 -3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Result -495 -768 -831 -1.551 649 129 -447 -453 15 -963 -425 123 101 114 63 114 121 153 166 180  
Appendix 2: Income Statement 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 20182018 IFRS162019 IFRS16 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Core
NOPLAT 360 134 363 116 234 383 558 545 -612 -26 530 497 500 438 479 481 507 534 561
Depreciation 985 944 898 910 943 916 1.307 1.389 1.295 1.302 1.325 1.347 1.377 1.405 1.428 1.461 1.496 1.533 1.570
Amortization of Intangibles 20 17 13 19 22 25 25 32 32 32 33 34 34 35 36 36 37 38 39
Amortization of Goodwill 36 30 23 32 36 40 40 49 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Operating Gross Cash Flow 1.402 1.125 1.297 1.076 1.236 1.364 1.930 2.015 761 1.356 1.934 1.924 1.958 1.925 1.990 2.025 2.088 2.151 2.217
Change in NWC 132 -357 -413 -136 59 -3 -34 -984 -23 164 162 -1 12 6 -13 -24 12 12 13
Net CAPEX 161 734 1.063 470 510 804 3.744 1.807 177 860 1.390 1.201 1.483 1.395 1.361 1.574 1.626 1.677 1.730
Change in Acquired Intangibles -269 -196 -545 308 29 -151 -151 39 47 62 63 64 65 67 68 69 71 72 74
Change in Other Net Operating Assets 232 230 145 170 -143 -2 -53 -138 233 -71 -66 -6 -5 -8 -9 -12 -13 -13 -13
Gross Investment -256 -411 -251 -811 -455 -648 -3.505 -724 -433 -1.014 -1.548 -1.257 -1.555 -1.459 -1.406 -1.607 -1.696 -1.749 -1.803
Core - Free Cash Flow (before Goodwill) 1.145 714 1.046 265 781 716 -1.575 1.291 328 342 386 666 403 466 584 418 391 403 414
Change in Goodwill -449 -384 -1.010 461 -1 -338 -338 -36 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Core - Free Cash Flow 1.595 1.098 2.056 -197 783 1.054 -1.237 1.327 281 295 339 619 356 419 537 371 344 356 367
Non - Core
Non Core Result -833 -709 -1.640 839 172 -591 -637 -122 76 70 63 63 62 61 61 60 59 58 57
Change in Other Non-Operating Assets 287 82 514 288 -244 -408 -322 728 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non - Core Cash Flow -1.121 -792 -2.154 551 416 -183 -315 -850 76 70 63 63 62 61 61 60 59 58 57
Cash Flow available to investors (Operational Busines CF)474 307 -98 354 1.198 872 -1.551 477 357 365 402 682 418 480 597 431 403 414 424
Financing
Financing Flows
Financing Result 312 268 262 259 234 221 355 411 427 469 470 459 447 436 425 419 413 426 438
Change in Excess Cash 1.266 -956 -119 226 161 -71 -71 -12 826 -138 -393 -93 -339 -260 -28 -185 199 205 210
Change in Debt 213 -1.015 268 -421 -713 -630 -630 -68 941 0 -300 -300 -300 -300 -200 -200 204 211 217
Change in Lease Liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.858 314 12 23 33 42 50 57 63 68 71 73 75
Flows to Debt Holders 1.365 327 -125 907 1.108 781 -1.944 153 300 308 344 623 357 418 534 367 338 347 356
Changes Due to Application of new Accounting Standards0 0 0 0 0 5 311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dividends Paid 0 0 0 21 47 55 55 57 57 57 58 59 61 62 63 64 66 67 68
Capital (Increase) / Decrease -2 136 27 36 43 32 27 266 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equity Issuance -889 -156 0 -608 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Flow to Equity Holders -891 -21 27 -552 90 91 393 323 57 57 58 59 61 62 63 64 66 67 68
Total Financing 474 307 -98 354 1.198 872 -1.551 477 357 365 402 682 418 480 597 431 403 414 424  












Report  Recommendations 
Buy Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
of more than 10% over a 12-month period. 
Hold Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
between 0% and 10% over a 12-month period. 
Sell Expected negative total return (including expected capital gains and expected 
dividend yield) over a 12-month period. 
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of Business and Economics (“Nova SBE”), within the context of the Field Lab – Equity Research. 
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This report was supervised by a Nova SBE faculty member, acting merely in an academic capacity, who 
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Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (“BaFin”, the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority). It should be 
noted that Nova SBE is a fully-owned state university and there is no relation between the student’s equity 
reports and any fund raising programme. 
UK: Pursuant to section 22 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the “FSMA”), for an activity to be 
a regulated activity, it must be carried on “by way of business”. All regulated activities are subject to prior 
authorization by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”). However, this report serves an exclusively 
academic purpose and, as such, was not prepared by way of business. The author - a Master’s student - is 
the sole and exclusive responsible for the information, estimates and forecasts contained herein, and for 
the opinions expressed, which exclusively reflect his/her own judgment at the date of the report. Nova SBE 
and its faculty have no single and formal position in relation to the most appropriate valuation method, 
estimates or projections used in the report and may not be held liable by the author’s choice of the latter. 
The information contained in this report was compiled by students from public sources believed to be reliable, 
but Nova SBE, its faculty, or the students make no representation that it is accurate or complete, and accept 
no liability whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss resulting from the use of this report or of its content. 
Students are free to choose the target companies of the reports. Therefore, Nova SBE may start covering 
and/or suspend the coverage of any listed company, at any time, without prior notice. The students or Nova 
SBE are not responsible for updating this report, and the opinions and recommendations expressed herein 
may change without further notice. 
The target company or security of this report may be simultaneously covered by more than one student. 
Because each student is free to choose the valuation method, and make his/her own assumptions and 
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to the same security. Moreover, changing market conditions and/or changing subjective opinions may lead to 
significantly different valuation results. Other students’ opinions, estimates and recommendations, as well as 
the advisor and other faculty members’ opinions may be inconsistent with the views expressed in this report. 
Any recipient of this report should understand that statements regarding future prospects and performance 
are, by nature, subjective, and may be fallible. 
This report does not necessarily mention and/or analyze all possible risks arising from the investment in the 
target company and/or security, namely the possible exchange rate risk resulting from the security being 
denominated in a currency either than the investor’s currency, among many other risks. 
The purpose of publishing this report is merely academic and it is not intended for distribution among private 
investors. The information and opinions expressed in this report are not intended to be available to any 
person other than Portuguese natural or legal persons or persons domiciled in Portugal. While preparing this 
report, students did not have in consideration the specific investment objectives, financial situation or  
 
particular needs of any specific person. Investors should seek financial advice regarding the appropriateness 
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Focusing on the COVID-19 pandemic and, specifically, on the impact social 
distancing measures could have on LATAM’s share price, using 3 Scenarios, 
each with distinct probabilities of occurrence. Departing from the weighted 
average Scenario, the final recommendation (SELL) would only be changed in 
the Good Scenario, which would imply a HOLD recommendation, with a 22,12% 
higher share price. In the remaining Scenarios (Base and Bad), the share price 
would be 7,1% and 61,1% lower, respectively, which would maintain its SELL 
recommendation. This also allowed to analyse by how much would LATAM have 
to increase its fares to avoid losing value.  
 
















Before I start writing about what I believe to be the most relevant topic in the aviation industry 
since 9/11, and one which will change the industry forever, I would like to acknowledge my partner 
Lukas Maasch and state the great experience that was working with him. This was a perfectly 
coordinated work, fairly divided, and with constant communication, even though we didn’t get to 
meet physically during this semester.  
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson defined1 as a critical juncture historical events which 
disturbed the economic and political equilibrium of a society and had a deep effect in changing 
the course of history. Examples of critical junctures throughout the History are the Black Death, 
in the mid-14th century, or the Industrial Revolution, which started in England in the second half 
of the 18th century. When specifically addressing the airline industry, the most recent events that 
fit this description are the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the 2008 Great Financial Crisis. 
Although it is still early to draw any conclusions about the real impact of this pandemic, it is 
becoming increasingly certain that the 2019-20 COVID-19 outbreak will also be part of such 
collection of historical events. It is an unprecedented situation to have such outbreak at a global 
scale, and it has brought virtually all the world into a lockdown in which most borders are closed, 
and people can only leave their homes to satisfy the most basic needs, whilst keep a minimum 
social distancing to ensure the safety of everyone.  
Perceptibly, the above description outlines the obvious: almost all flights in the world are 
currently grounded, with the air space being reduced to cargo transportation and a small 
percentage of necessary passenger flights. At the time this report was written, LATAM Airlines 
only had 5% of its scheduled flights operating, with just 3 international routes, and only around 
40% of its domestic routes, operating with minimum required levels. 
To better assess LATAM’s future revenue outlook in the midst of the uncertainty, two parallel 
scenario analysis were constructed: one regarding the recovery of passenger demand, which 
assumed the 4 Scenarios described on the group report (a U-shape recovery, a prolonged U-
shaped recovery, an L-shaped recovery which assumed a lower future industry growth, and a W-
shaped recovery which assumed a resurgence of the pandemic after relaxing the lockdown 
measures in late 2020 and early 2021), and a scenario accounting for possible social distancing 
 
1 Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, “Why Nations Fail”, 2013 
measures. This second scenario was included directly in the load factor for each year, meaning 
the target share price reflects the weighted probability of each scenario. However, I will, on this 
report, further assess what the impact of such measures would mean for LATAM Airlines should 
they be enforced, and for how long. Hence, a sensitivity analysis for each individual load factor 
scenario will be conducted, along with any required fare change that would have to be necessary 
for LATAM to survive and avoid having a negative market value of its debt (which would mean its 
assets would not be enough to pay for its debt obligations and the company would default on its 
debt). 
It is still uncertain whether such measures would be enforced. On one hand, it looks increasingly 
likely, at least in the short-term, as countries are beginning to return to normal daily activities with 
precaution. Thus, it is hard to imagine governments enforcing social distancing rules in social 
gathering places such as restaurants, beaches, or even supermarkets and not do the same for 
airplanes. On the other hand, it is also unclear whether the use of face masks could actually be 
an effective substitute for social distancing. If so, social distancing measures would not be 
necessary, as long as all passengers comply with health and sanitation instructions. Lufthansa, 
for instance, turned to the second option earlier this month, after having very low load factors due 
to scrapping the middle seat on every plane. It argues that the aircraft cabin design allows for an 
air quality similar to that of an open space2.  
Obviously, every country is a specific case, and the evolution of the pandemic in Europe could be 
completely different from that of South America, and as airlines have to follow their own 
governments directories, this might not be the case for LATAM.  
Thus, 3 distinct Scenarios were built:  
(i) A Base Scenario,  
(ii) A Good Scenario, and 
(iii) A Bad Scenario. 
The Base Scenario is a rather pessimistic one, as it assumes social distancing rules until mid-
2021. This not only accounts for the speed of return to normal activity, but also for the possibility 
that airplanes might become a focus of contagion, given the proximity between passengers. 
 
2 Simple Flying – “Lufhtansa ends social distancing with mandatory face masks”  
Hence, this is seen as the most realistic “base” option. The Good Scenario assumed there would 
be no social distancing measures and the mandatory use of face masks would be enough for 
the passengers to avoid the spread of the virus. The Bad Scenario assumes social distancing 
rules until mid-2022, as this scenario is directly tied to the resurgence recovery Scenario. If there 
is a new virus outbreak towards the end of the year, the new measures would likely be more rigid 
than the current ones to prevent a new wave of a pandemic that, at the time of this report, has 
already lasted for 6 months and is only now starting to show some signs it may be starting to slow 
down. In the valuation of the company, the probabilities of 45%, 40%, and 15% were respectively 
assigned to each Scenario. 
To better understand the real impact of such measures on the valuation of LATAM, I will not only 
assess each individual scenario and compare them, both in terms of the revenue decrease, and 
also, ceteris paribus, in terms of the subsequent necessary average fare increase for LATAM to 
keep the same intrinsic value, should the resultant share price be lower. Note that it is assumed 
that this is a common problem to all the airlines in South America, meaning no market share is 
lost with the revenue increase. Moreover, it is assumed that, beginning in 2023, as the load factors 
go back to “normal”, so do the average fares. 
The first analysis to be done is understanding how sensitive the share price of LATAM is to a 
decrease in the load factors of the weighted scenario, and how much would the average fares 
have to increase on these 3 years (2020 to 2022) for LATAM’s value to be kept constant. It should 
be further noticed that all domestic and international regional flights are assumed to be performed 
by narrow-body aircraft (with a 3-3 configuration, meaning social distancing would mean a 
maximum load factor of 66%) and all international long-haul flights are assumed to be performed 
by wide-body aircraft (LATAM’s wide-body aircrafts have different configurations – 2-4-2, 3-4-3. 
3-3-3, and 2-3-2 – and its maximum load factors were weighted accordingly). 
The sensitivity analysis is presented below:  
 
2,26 0,00% 2,00% 4,00% 6,00% 8,00% 10,00% 12,00% 15,00% 18,00% 20,00%
0,00% 2,26 2,50 2,73 2,97 3,21 3,45 3,68 4,04 4,40 4,63
2,00% 1,97 2,21 2,44 2,67 2,90 3,13 3,37 3,72 4,06 4,30
4,00% 1,69 1,91 2,14 2,37 2,60 2,82 3,05 3,39 3,73 3,96
6,00% 1,40 1,62 1,84 2,06 2,29 2,51 2,73 3,06 3,40 3,62
8,00% 1,11 1,33 1,54 1,76 1,98 2,19 2,41 2,73 3,06 3,28
10,00% 0,82 1,03 1,24 1,45 1,66 1,88 2,09 2,40 2,72 2,93
12,00% 0,53 0,73 0,94 1,14 1,35 1,56 1,76 2,07 2,38 2,59
15,00% 0,08 0,28 0,48 0,68 0,88 1,08 1,27 1,57 1,87 2,07














From these results, it can be understood that any given percentual point decrease in the load 
factor would always require LATAM Airlines to increase its average fares to maintain its value. 
This means that any abrupt change in the load factor could severely hamper the company’s value, 
as an even sharper increase in fares would be needed. Abruptly increasing the fares, especially 
during this crisis, could have catastrophic effects: an already low passenger demand due to 
uncertainty surrounding the virus would be even lower as potential customers, especially tourists 
and the remaining non-business travelers, who are cutting on superfluous expenses, would be 
even less eager to travel. Furthermore, people are getting more used to work remotely, meaning 
there is also less need for business travel, thus lowering the demand of this group of passengers, 
which usually is less averse to changes in price. 
It is thus important to directly compare the statistically expected Scenario to three individual 
Scenarios, especially the Base and Bad Scenarios, to assess by how much would LATAM have 
to increase its fares to maintain its value should it occur; and if the Bad Scenario is actually 
putting the future of the company at risk, given the remaining assumptions of the valuation 
model. Given the difference between these Scenarios hinges solely on the duration of the social 
distancing measures, it is logical that the load factor is the same in 2020. Below are the load 
factors assumed for each of these scenarios: 
                                                                   
  
By applying the same sensitivity analysis whilst considering these differences, and 
complementing it with the goal-seek tool from Excel, it results that, should the Bad Scenario 
occur, LATAM would have to increase its average fares by 7,94% to obtain the same result. 
Comparing to the Expected Scenario, and considering only the load factor change, ceteris 
paribus, revenues are 2,91% lower in 2020, 11,37% lower in 2021, and 6,22% lower in 2022. 
Given the load factors are back to normal in 2023, there are no changes in the values starting 
from this year. FCF is 11,9% lower in 2020, 88,1% lower in 2021, and 97,7% lower in 2022. There 
BAD SCENARIO 2020 2021 2022
Brazil Domestic Load Factor 71,01% 66,67% 74,58%
Rest Domestic Load Factor 71,10% 66,67% 73,74%
International Regional 71,74% 66,67% 75,79%
International Long Haul 69,39% 62,09% 73,53%
BASE SCENARIO 2020 2021 2022
Brazil Domestic Load Factor 71,01% 73,33% 82,50%
Rest Domestic Load Factor 71,10% 71,12% 80,82%
International Regional 71,74% 73,47% 84,92%
International Long Haul 69,39% 71,19% 84,92%
GOOD SCENARIO 2020 2021 2022
Brazil Domestic Load Factor 75,35% 79,98% 82,50%
Rest Domestic Load Factor 75,53% 75,57% 80,82%
International Regional 76,82% 80,28% 84,92%
International Long Haul 76,82% 80,28% 84,92%
EXPECTED SCENARIO 2020 2021 2022
Brazil Domestic Load Factor 72,75% 74,99% 81,31%
Rest Domestic Load Factor 72,87% 72,23% 79,75%
International Regional 73,77% 75,18% 83,55%
International Long Haul 72,36% 73,46% 83,21%
is also a spillover of effects in 2023, with FCF being 15,6% lower than in the Expected Scenario. 
From 2024 onwards, it is equal to the expected scenario. ROIC also decreases considerably 
every year. The share price decreases to $1,38, representing a 61,1% decrease. This would keep 
our recommendation at SELL.  
If the Base Scenario occurs, the results are very similar to those of the expected scenario. 
Revenues would be, on average, 1,7% lower each year, with the FCF being, on average, 8% 
lower each year (even though the 2023 value would actually be 1,7% higher). ROIC would be 
slightly lower in 2020 and 2021, and slightly higher in 2023, as the load factor in 2023 is higher 
than the expected. The share price decreases to $2,10, representing a 7,1% decrease. This would 
also keep our recommendation at SELL. Moreover, in this scenario, fares would have to be 
increased by 1,34% for LATAM’s share price to be the same. 
Conversely, if the Good Scenario is to happen (i.e., no social distancing measures), revenues 
would be higher in each year of the 3 years by an average of 4,53%. FCF would also be higher 
every year from 2020 to 2024, by an average of 28,8%. ROIC, as expected, would also be higher 
in each of the relevant years. The share price increases to $2,76, representing a 22,12% increase, 
and our recommendation would swiftly change from SELL to HOLD. 
These results show how sensitive the value of LATAM is to small changes in the load factor, 
and how harmful social distancing measures can be for airlines if these do not receive any 
government compensation. Should the Bad Scenario happen, LATAM would have to 
considerably increase its fares to maintain its value. However, should governments follow IATA’s 
recommendation3 and allow airlines to fly without any restrictions, LATAM would actually increase 
its value and would even have room to eventually decrease its fares and steal market share from 
its LCC competitors, which tend to work on thinner operational margins. 
 
 
3 IATA – “Social distancing would make most airlines financially unviable”; Simple Flying – “IATA 
suggests scrapping social distancing for face masks” 
